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ABSTRACT

Three Essays on Pricing and the Price Discovery Process of Sovereign Credit Default Swaps
(August 2017)
Zubair Ali Raja, B.Sc. Computer Science, University of Engineering and Technology,
Lahore; M.B.A. in Finance, The University of Punjab, Lahore; M.B.A. in International
Business, Texas A&M International University
Chair of Committee: Dr. George R. Clarke
In the first essay, author undertakes a comprehensive study of eight emerging
sovereign entities in order to determine the nature of long-run dynamic interaction between
two highly related financial markets on which same, respective, sovereign credit/ default risk
is traded. Thus, eight pairs of individual sovereign credit risk prices are independently
analyzed using daily time series data during the time period 2006-2016 to determine which
market more quickly impounds new information in efficiently pricing the credit risk. These
related markets are sovereign credit default swap (CDS) and bond markets. Country level
analysis suggests that prices in both markets move in tandem with each other and the
sovereign CDS market dominates the price discovery process during tranquil periods,
contributing more than 70% to the overall price discovery process, a finding attributed to its
greater relative liquidity. However, during the crisis, a common stochastic trend is missing
between CDS and bond spreads, suggesting that during times of extreme distress, these
markets price credit risk differently. These results have implications for emerging market
investors and asset managers who engage in arbitrage between the two markets as well as
financial stakeholders who monitor sovereign credit spreads to gauge the level of political
and/or default risk in emerging markets.
The second and third essays are closely related as they attempt to establish the notion
that socioeconomic variables are key predictors of sovereign CDS prices. Existing literature

v
focuses overwhelmingly on global financial and country specific macroeconomic variables as
determinants of CDS spread. Using the data from 66 countries over the period of 2007-2015,
significant support is reported for the hypothesis in the second essay that state fragility, a
socioeconomic construct borrowed from foreign policy literature, positively affects the CDS
pricing. This support is robust across different regression models with varying specifications.
Two way fixed effect model reports that after controlling for global and country specific
macroeconomic variables a 1% increase in state fragility, ceteris paribus, causes an increase
in CDS premium by 1.60%. Using the data from 2015 for 52 countries, essay three reports
that one percentage point increase in social capital of a country causes credit derivative prices
to decrease by 1.19%.
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1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Credit default swaps (CDS, hereafter) act as insurance against the financial loss of
bond holders in case any credit event is triggered. They protect the holders of specific bonds,
also called underlying bonds or reference obligations, when the bond issuing entity, also
referred to as the reference entity, defaults or is unable to meet its contractual obligations.
Although the role of CDS was controversial during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 and later
during the European debt crisis, it certainly has been a remarkable recent financial innovation
which could potentially improve the overall efficiency of the financial system. CDSs are
widely traded derivatives which provide a venue to hedge investors’ credit exposure and to
extend their investment opportunity set through its effective use in the investment portfolio.
Its introduction has positive market efficiency and welfare effects, which are channeled
through its dynamic interaction with underlying security (bond) market (Criado, Degabriel,
Lewandowska, Lindén, & Ritter, 2010). It provides bond holders with the opportunity to
transfer their credit risk to CDS market participants, who are willing to own the bond
holder’s default risk, in exchange for periodic quarterly or semi-annually premiums without
changing their positions in the underlying bond. Thus, it reduces transaction costs and allows
for risk distribution among a larger pool of market participants which is beneficial to both
private investors and overall society.
In CDS and bond markets, highly related assets are traded based on the same
underlying credit risk i.e., price of CDS, also referred to as CDS spread or CDS premium,

This dissertation follows the model of Journal of International Money and Finance.
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in CDS market and bond spread1 in bond market. Indeed, CDS is a derivative that derives its
value from the credit risk of the underlying bond. If the credit risk – proxied by distance to
default— is higher for a company or sovereign entity then its bond spread will be higher as
well, resulting in an increase in CDS spreads which the protection seller will charge to the
investor.
The introduction of CDS helps improve the efficiency of the bond market as more
participants can express their views about the credit risk of the underlying reference entity,
thus moving the default risk price closer to its true intrinsic value. Its introduction may also
benefit bond issuing entities to have access to low cost funding as bond prices might remain
stable due to the avenue available to bondholders to buy protection against their credit risk
exposure. However, a possible negative effect of CDS trading is the diversion of liquidity
from bond to derivative market due to an excessive number of pessimistic investors and
traders with naked positions2. This can lead to a higher required rate of return and liquidity
premiums in cash market which make the debt more expensive. Speculative CDS trading
during the European sovereign crisis has already been held responsible by critics for higher
borrowing cost for sovereign entities3. Naked exposure in the CDS market gives rise to the
possibility of arbitrage profits as highly related CDS and bond markets may end up pricing
the underlying credit risk differently, which may provide the opportunity to earn riskless
profits.
In this context, the first part of this dissertation aims to further the nascent literature
on market efficiency and the price discovery process (PDP, hereafter) of credit risk in the

1

Also called bond credit spread or simply credit spread
Position in which protection buyer does not hold underlying bond but still invests in CDS for speculative
reasons
3
https://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2013/01/pdf/c2.pdf
2
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area of emerging sovereign CDS and bond markets. Most studies on this topic have been
conducted on corporate CDS. Hull and White (2000), Blanco et al. (2005), Longstaff et al.
(2005), Zhu (2006), and Forte and Pena (2009) for example, all study the dynamic interaction
between credit and bond spread, and the price discovery process of credit risk in CDS and
bond markets using data on investment grade corporate entities. These studies consistently
report that the CDS market leads the bond market in efficient pricing of corporate credit risk.
Conversely, in the case of sovereign CDS (sCDS, hereafter), findings of price discovery
studies on default risk are mixed and ambiguous (Augustin, 2014). Chan-Lau and Kim
(2004), Fontana and Scheicher (2010), and Hassan, Ngene, and Yu (2011b) 4, for example,
find mixed results regarding the dominance of any particular market in pricing the default
risk.
The sCDS market is different from corporate CDS in many ways. For example, in the
corporate CDS market, credit prices are determined based on both public and private
information. However, in the case of sCDS, typically, only publicly available information
drives the credit spread. Likewise, in the case of corporations, measurement of credit risk
relies on key variables such as industrial characteristics, management competency, asset to
debt ratio etc. Conversely, for sovereign entities these measurement criteria are not
applicable. Therefore, the sovereign CDS market is distinctive and results of the studies on
dynamic interaction between their CDS and bond spreads differ from those of corporate
studies.
In the studies conducted on the price discovery process of credit risk in sCDS, one
concern is the length of data. Almost all studies use the Vector Error Correction Model

4

Though out of seven countries they analyzed, the overall bond market leads CDS market in terms of price
discovery of default risk
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(VECM) –which is supposed to analyze the long-run dynamic interaction between two time
series— with short time period data sets. Furthermore, although all credit markets including
emerging sCDS markets have witnessed unprecedented re-pricing of default risk since the
global financial crises (Fontana & Scheicher, 2010) and get matured; most of the recent
research in the area is conducted on Eurozone sovereign entities only. This is because prior to
the financial crisis, developed countries’ bonds were mainly considered information
insensitive and treated as safe assets. As a result limited amount of sCDS were written on
their bonds and their CDS markets were illiquid. Once the vulnerability of developed
countries was proven in the wake of the global crisis, sCDS trading on their bonds gained
momentum and researchers began to study the relationship between credit risk prices in
sCDS and cash markets of developed countries. Thus, recent research ignores the detailed
analysis of the price discovery process of credit risk for emerging entities, which are unique
compared to the developed ones due to their different macroeconomic conditions. Recent
episodes such as China’s financial meltdown in 2015, the impact of reduced oil prices on
countries like Russia, and the executive order issued from the Puerto Rican governor’s office
to declare a moratorium on a portion of debt on 30th June 20165, re-emphasize the importance
of understanding the nature of emerging sovereign credit risk. Because this risk is being
traded in the sCDS and underlying cash markets, by studying the price discovery process of
aforementioned risk, involving these two markets, stakeholders can timely assess which
market efficiently prices credit risk for emerging countries.
The second and third essays of this dissertation attempt to establish the relationship
between sCDS pricing and socioeconomic constructs which, to the best of my knowledge,

5

As Puerto Rica was unable to meet its obligation to back the debt worth $2 billion due on 1st July 2016
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have not yet been explored in the literature. Usually pricing of sCDS has been associated
with country specific macroeconomic variables and global financial factors. However, the
second essay proposes that a non-traditional construct, namely state fragility, borrowed from
foreign policy literature is positively associated with the sovereign CDS spread. State
fragility has been defined in different ways in the foreign policy literature, however its
modern definition evolved in the context of the war on terror (Call, 2008). According to this
recent definition fragile state concept is linked with terrorism, thus indicating that these states
are not only subject to terrorism themselves but can also be a threat to world peace.
Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray (2011) mention fragile states as those states which are not
able to improve their economic growth and/ or able to reduce the poverty due to their
ineffective policies and governance, and poor institutional performance. This results in an
inability to absorb the inflow of funds effectively —generated either through aid or loan—
and therefore results in added premiums required by the creditors as compensation to bear
additional sovereign credit risk. Therefore, intuitively CDS spreads of fragile states should
also be high.
In the third essay the impact of another construct, called social capital, is determined
on sovereign CDS premium. According to Fukuyama (2001), it represents the “instantiated
informal norms” that allows collaboration among different parties. Countries with high social
capital have high levels of generalized trust. In such societies people try to abstain from
devious behaviors to avoid internal and external guilt as society collectively punishes people
with an intent of opportunistic behaviors. Positive impacts of social capital have been widely
reported in political economy, management and accounting literature especially on country’s
economic and financial development. At the same time, sovereign CDS pricing literature

6
reports the negative relationship between country’s economic development and its CDS
premium. Therefore, this compelled the author of this dissertation to hypothesize a negative
association between social capital and sovereign CDS premium of the country.

1.2 Overview of Credit Default Swap
1.2.1 What are Credit Default Swaps?
A credit default swap (CDS) is a fixed-income derivative which derives its value
from the credit risk of the specific underlying bond —identified by its maturity, coupon,
CUSIP etc. in the CDS contract– against which it is traded. A CDS typically is a bilateral
over-the-counter (OTC, hereafter) contract, though significant numbers of standardized CDS
contracts have started trading on formal exchanges. The purpose of a CDS is to protect the
investment of lenders against any default, in case a credit event is triggered. These credit
events usually occur when the bond issuing authority, which can be any corporation or
government, is not able to meet its debt related contractual obligations. CDS are typically
issued and traded against unsecured senior debt. Thus CDS acts as insurance against the
default of bond issuer, allowing lenders to hedge their credit exposure. However, like other
derivatives, one can have a naked exposure in the CDS market with the sole purpose of
investment without necessarily having any investment in the underlying bond. The specific
bond mentioned in the CDS contract is also called the reference obligation and the issuing
authority of the bond is termed as reference entity.
Like all insurance, the buyer of the CDS needs to pay a periodic premium, usually on
a quarterly or semi-annual basis, to the underwriter for bearing the credit risk. In line with the
classical risk-reward principle of finance the premium is positively correlated with the
likelihood of the reference entity being unable to meet its debt related obligations. Moreover
the higher the number of credit events listed in the CDS contract, the higher will be the CDS
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premium charged by the protection seller. It is the fixed amount paid periodically by the CDS
buyer until the expiration of the contract. This premium is also called the CDS spread or
CDS price and listed as basis points, in annual terms, in the CDS market. For example if the
CDS spread on an underlying bond having a face value of $1000 is traded at, say, 200 basis
points (2%) then it means that a quarterly payment of $5 is due by the CDS buyer thus
summing up to the total of $20 for the whole year. The CDS buyer can also opt to protect
only a part of his investment if he is willing to bear some portion of the overall credit
exposure. For instance in this example if the protection buyer is willing to buy CDS of only
$500 on the underlying bond of $1000 then instead of $5.00 he needs to pay only $2.50 each
quarter as he is protected for only half of the face value of the reference bond. However, he
needs to ensure that CDS of this denomination is available at the exchange or that some
dealer offers it in the OTC market.
Exact details about what constitutes a credit event are mentioned in Article-IV of Credit
Derivatives Definitions6 issued by International Swap and Derivative Association (ISDA) in
the year 20037. Typical credit events which trigger corporate CDS payment include, but are
not limited to, bankruptcy and restructuring. Because sovereign entities are different than
corporate ones, therefore the credit events which trigger sCDS payment also include
repudiation/ moratorium in addition to bankruptcy. ISDA defines these credit events as
follow:


Bankruptcy: When the reference entity of dissolved (other than merger or
amalgamation), becomes insolvent, seeks judgment for insolvency under the

6

https://globalmarkets.bnpparibas.com/gm/features/docs/dfdisclosures/2003_ISDA_Credit_Derivatives_Definiti
ons.pdf
7
Subsequently amended in February, 2014 and became effective from 22 nd September 2014
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bankruptcy law, pass resolution for winding-up or liquidation etc.


Failure to Pay: When the reference entity (bond issuer) is unable to pay after the
expiration of any applicable grace period.



Repudiation/ Moratorium: When an official from a bond issuing corporate or
government authority rejects or challenges the validity of the whole or a part of the
debt contract, imposes a ban or prohibition with respect to the obligation, or simply
restructures the obligation in terms of maturity or payment amount.



Restructuring: When the reference entity a) reduces the interest rate, interest amount
and principal amount; b) delays the payment of interest or principal and c) changes
the currency of interest or principal payments except for payments in Euro by
European Union Member State which has adopted the currency after becoming a
member of the Union.

Once any of the above mentioned credit events is triggered, the CDS seller needs to pay
protection to the buyer either through a physical or cash settlement8. Under physical
settlement, the underlying bond will simply be handed over to the seller who will pay the full
face value of the contract to the CDS buyer. In the case of cash settlement only the difference
between the face value and the market value of the bond is paid to the bondholder. For
example, upon the triggering of any credit event, the CDS seller needs to pay $40,000 to the
buyer if the underlying bond with face value of $50,000 is being valued at only $10,000 by
the market9.
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Cash settlement can also lead to the issue of naked exposure where one does not necessarily have to own a
bond before buying the protection. Such exposure lead to a controversy during European sovereign crisis as it
has been credited with increased borrowing cost of debt of sovereign entities.
9
Price of the bond of default entity is determined by an independent committee called Credit Derivatives
Determination Committee (CDDS) which conduct polls among CDS market makers

9
A key difference between CDS spreads and coupon payment of underlying bond is
that CDS spread is considered as a pure proxy of the reference entity’s credit risk. On the
other hand, credit risk is just a small portion of the overall risk10 for which the bondholders
are rewarded through coupon payments. Return for bearing the credit risk is embedded in the
interest payment of the underlying bond. Thus, under no arbitrage, if the investor requires a
credit risk premium of 2% on a bond which is paying a 4% return (excluding default
premium) then price of the CDS traded on underlying bond should be 200 basis points and
the total annual return on the bond should be 6% (4%+2%). Therefore, by its mechanics CDS
and bonds are highly related as they measure the same default risk and one can earn arbitrage
profits if they do not price default risk at the same level.
1.2.2 CDS Market and Subsequent Development of Sovereign CDS
CDSs were initially introduced in the mid-1990s by banks to transfer their risk on
commercial loans and provide a cushion to regulatory requirements in maintaining their
capital. CDS for corporate and municipal bonds started being sold in the late-1990s. In
derivative markets, CDS takes third spot in terms of high volume after derivatives traded on
interest rates and foreign exchange. According to Bank for International Settlements (BIS),
the volume of this market reached the notional amount11 of $58 trillion by the end of 2007.
As of December 2014 this stands at $16 trillion12 as trading of this instrument sharply
declined after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September, 2008. Initially the growth of

10

Which includes interest rate and liquidity risk along with credit risk
Notional amount is the total amount of the all outstanding contracts e.g., in the world of two parties ‘A’ and
‘B’ where party ‘A’ has sold a protection of US$ 2 Million on an underlying bond to party ‘B’ and ‘B’ has sold
the protection on the same underlying asset of US$ 1 million to ‘A’, the notional amount of CDS would be US$
3 million. On the other hand gross market value of CDS contracts is only US$ 1 million i.e., if both parties will
not be able to meet their obligation then there is a net loss of US$ I million only instead of being US$ 3 million,
as party ‘A’ will not be able to pay net amount of US$ 1 million to party ‘B; if credit event triggers on the
reference entity.
12
http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1504.pdf, page 5
11
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the CDS market was not that impressive. However, since the introduction of a standardized
master agreement by the ISDA in 1998, the credit default swap market has grown rapidly (J.
Hull, Predescu, & White, 2004). The ISDA master agreement, which governs all credit
default swap transactions brought liquidity to the market as it reduced the high cost of
negotiation (in terms of time delays). This expansion was further fueled by the introduction
of the credit derivatives definitions in 2003.
Within the CDS market various innovations have been introduced by the market
makers resulting in the availability of different kinds of CDS products to investors and
hedgers. Apart from single name CDS, multi-name CDS are also available which provides
protection to buyers against multiple reference entities through a single transaction rather
than buying single name CDS for each underlying reference entity individually, thus
resulting in reduced transaction costs. For example if an investor owns five bonds and needs
to transfer the credit exposure on each one of them then he can buy a multi-name CDS
(single contract), if offered by any dealer, referencing the issuers of all those bonds. If any of
the reference entity defaults in that basket the CDS seller is bound to settle the contract by
paying the amount related to insolvent entity. Another important product offered in the CDS
market is the CDS index, which works in the same fashion as the indexes in equity and bond
markets. Typically an investment fund manager with a large portfolio can hedge his credit
exposure by buying a CDS index or he can simply include the index in his investment
portfolio with no actual exposure in underlying obligations included in the index. These
indexes are formed based on different criteria which include credit worthiness of underlying
entities, country and/or region of reference entity, industry etc.
In recent years, particularly after the financial crisis and the subsequent Eurozone
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crisis, the role of sovereign CDS (sCDS, hereafter) have been under the limelight. Although
the notional amount of all CDS keeps on decreasing since 2007, the share of sCDS notional
amount as percentage of total notional amount of all outstanding CDS remained stable and
grew from below 5% to nearly 15%13, reaching its peak of $3.2 trillion in 2013. Before the
Lehman Brothers collapsed in fall 2008, trading in CDS were mainly concentrated
referencing corporate entities and sovereign emerging markets. But since then the market has
re-assessed the default risk of developed countries, resulting in increased trade of their sCDS
(Fontana & Scheicher, 2010). According to global financial stability report of IMF, issued in
April 2013, sCDS have been offered to trade in OTC market by reporting dealers, since 2001,
after the demise of Brady bond future contracts. These contracts were traded on the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME) for three countries i.e., Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. Demand
for a more flexible sovereign risk hedging instrument drives the genesis of sCDS14. Like its
corporate counterpart sCDS is used for hedging, speculative and basis trading. sCDSs take a
unique and enhanced role after the financial crises of 2007.
Prior to the financial crisis most CDS contracts referenced emerging countries as they
were perceived to be the most risky reference entities among sovereign countries. However,
after the crisis trading on sCDS referencing advanced economies got momentum as market
participants realized that systemic risk associated with advanced countries have profound and
deeper impact on global financial stability. After the Eurozone debt crisis, sCDS become
more controversial and have been in the limelight owing to their perceived role in worsening
it. Speculative trading of these instruments during the crisis led to higher credit spread prices
which were not justifiable given underlying fundamentals of the economy resulting in higher

13
14

http://stats.bis.org/statx/srs/table/d5.2
https://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2013/01/pdf/c2.pdf, page 59
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interest rate on the sovereign bonds15 (theoretically sCDS spread and bond yields are
positively correlated). This in turn, increased the borrowing cost of debt for sovereign entities
by driving down the prices of their bonds. Overwhelming support of this notion led to the
ban on speculative trading on sCDS in Europe in 2011. However, some experts challenge this
logic and consider sCDS a vital market-based sovereign risk indicator. According to the 2013
IMF global financial stability report’s findings, this ban will limit the rational price discovery
process of credit risk as more participants bring informational efficiency in the market which
is key to set efficient pricing of any asset.
The notional volume of sCDS increased since it was first reported by Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) in the second half of 2004 until the first half of 2013,
reaching its peak value of $ 3.2 trillion. Since the second half of 2013 there has been a
downward trend in the volume of sCDS, though it is still stable relative to the total volume of
all the CDS. This can be seen in figure 1.1 which shows that total volume of all CDS, since
2007, has sharply declined and that of sCDS is relatively stable. Figure 1.2 suggests that
volume of sCDS, as percentage of total CDS, has reached its peak in the first half of 2015
where it accounts for approximately 15% of the total CDS notional volume. Reduction in the
volume of sCDS from its peak value of $3 trillion in 2013 to $2 trillion in 2015 is greatly
attributed to the ban on naked exposure by regulators in Europe.
The sCDS market has its own unique attributes compared to the overall CDS market.
Though the majority of CDS contracts in the market are single names i.e., 55% of notional
value outstanding belongs to single name but these numbers are at extreme in the case of
sCDS where 95% belongs to single name contracts. This can be witnessed in figure 1.3 and

15

This point of view against speculative trading mostly holds among governments and politicians.
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Figure 1.1: Total volume of all CDS and sovereign CDS over the years
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Source: Bank for International Settlements (BIS) website; years on y-axis and US$ in billions on x-axis

Figure 1.2: Volume of sovereign CDS as %age of total outstanding CDS over the years
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figure 1.4. It also supports the rationality to analyze single name sCDS time series data,
rather than index data, to gain further insight of this market. Overall CDS market is
concentrated as high volume of notional amount is traded among few reporting dealers.
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Figure 1.3: Distribution of CDS between single and multiple CDS as of Dec. 2014
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Figure 1.4: Percentage of single and multiple name sovereign CDS as of Dec. 2014
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2014
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Source: Bank for International Settlements (BIS) website.

According to figure 1.6 major volume i.e. 47% of total notional amount outstanding is
bought and sold by reporting dealers. This figure also shows the rising contribution of central
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counterparties which mitigate counterparty risk and serve as exchange where more
standardized contracts are traded. The role of these counterparties was enhanced after the
financial crisis in 2007. In the case of sCDS, same first spot is held by reporting dealers but
sCDS market seems far more concentrated compared to the overall CDS market as 66% (see
figure 1.5) of sCDS total notional volume is held by the handful of reporting dealers. These
dealers are big banks which are globally systemically important financial institutions. The
prime reason for their domination in sell and buy sides of sCDS market is related to their
huge exposure in sovereign debt. According to Fitch Ratings16 top 10 U.S. and European
financial institutes act as counterparties of 80% of all sCDS trade. Hedge funds are the net
buyers of the sCDS after financial crisis, whereas they used to be the net seller early.
Figure 1.5: Market concentration for sovereign CDS as of December 2014
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In short, compared to the overall corporate CDS market, the sCDS market has its own
peculiarities. Another important difference between the sCDS market and the corporate CDS

16

Published in 2011.
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market is that volume of underlying sovereign bonds is much higher compared to the volume
of sCDS offered for trade (approx. $19.6 trillion outstanding in sovereign bonds vs. only $2.4
trillion notional amount of sCDS by the end of December, 201417). The situation is totally
different in the case of corporate CDS market as notional amount of CDS referencing
corporate entities is much higher than the total amount of outstanding bonds issued by the
firms.
Figure 1.6: Market concentration for all CDS as of December 2014
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1.3 The Relationship between CDS Prices and Bond Credit Spread
The price of a CDS is considered to be a measure of the default risk18 of the entity, on
whose bonds the CDS is being traded (Chan-Lau & Kim, 2004). It should be equal to the
amount of the underlying bond’s yield spread, of par-floating rate note, over and above the
interest rate of floating risk-free security of the same tenure (Duffie, 1999). Here, the
intuition is fairly simple. By holding a risky bond whose annual return is, say, ‘Y’ and then

17
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http://www.bis.org/statistics/c2.pdf
I will interchangeably use terms, default risk and credit risk throughout this draft.
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buying a CDS protection on the bond for an annual premium of, say, ‘C’ an investor will end
up earning a net annual return of ‘Y-C’. These two transactions are equivalent to holding a
risk-free treasury bond of the same maturity with an annual risk-free return of ‘RF’, that is
‘RF=Y-C’. Therefore, if company XYZ has issued a five-year bond and a CDS is written on
this bond in order that debt holders can hedge their credit exposure then theoretically CDS
spread, which is simply a measure of credit risk of XYZ, should be given as follows:
𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑥𝑦𝑧,5 = 𝐵𝑌𝑇𝑀𝑥𝑦𝑧,5 − 𝑅𝐹5
Where
𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑥𝑦𝑧,5 is the price of credit default swap traded on the bond with 5-year maturity issued
by ‘XYZ’ company19
𝐵𝑌𝑇𝑀𝑥𝑦𝑧,5 is the total yield-to-maturity of the 5 year bond issued by the ‘XYZ’
𝑅𝐹5 is the interest rate of risk-free treasury bond of the same maturity, i.e., 5-years, and
(𝐵𝑌𝑇𝑀𝑥𝑦𝑧,5 − 𝑅𝐹5 ), this difference is called bond spread (usually denoted by 𝐵𝑆𝑥𝑦𝑧,5 ) which
is the measure of credit spread extracted from bond market
Details of aforementioned theoretical relation are discussed in depth in Duffie (1999).
Theoretically under no market frictions, the difference between the CDS spread and bond
spread, called CDS-bond basis (𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑥𝑦𝑧,𝑖 − 𝐵𝑆𝑥𝑦𝑧,𝑖 ), should be equal to zero. However, the
no-friction assumptions which Duffie makes do not hold in reality20. As a result, violation of
these assumptions results in non-zero basis for both corporate and sovereign entities, an
occurrence which is consistently documented in the empirical literature (Fontana and
Scheicher (2010), Arce et al (2013), Augustin (2014), among others).
Five year CDS is used here for explanation purpose as it’s spread is commonly used in the empirical literature
on CDS.
20
First, both risky and risk-free bonds are par-floating rate instruments. Second, there should be no transaction
cost and effects of tax must be negligible. Third, in case of credit event payment of CDS spread should stop.
Fourth, once credit event occurs, protection buyer should be paid on next coupon date.
19
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This non-zero basis suggests the presence of arbitrage opportunity in a frictionless
market. Theoretically; if the CDS-bond basis is negative —CDS spread is lower than the
underlying bond’s credit spread— investors can take a long position in the risky bond and
purchase the maturity matched CDS to hedge their credit risk. In doing so, they can earn
riskless profits and over time, as more investors adopt this trading strategy, the arbitrage
opportunity will disappear, with the CDS-bond basis returning to zero. Conversely, when
CDS basis is positive, investors can sell the underlying risky bond, taking short position in
risky asset and write (sell) CDS on the shorted bond to earn riskless excess profit. Once
again, as more investors put on this trade, the resulting price movements from the buying and
selling will return the basis to zero. However, as mentioned above empirical literature on
CDS and bond markets document a consistent non-zero basis, suggesting the presence of a
number of factors which prevent arbitrageurs from monetizing the basis spread.
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2 ESSAY 1: PRICE DISCOVERY OF CREDIT RISK IN
EMERGING SOVEREIGN CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP AND
BOND MARKET
2.1 Introduction
Due to the increasing exposure of investors to the sovereign debt market, sovereign
credit risk has become an increasingly important area to study. The price of sovereign credit
risk is determined in two markets i.e., bond market and credit default swap (CDS21, hereafter)
market. CDS are a flexible financial hedging instrument used to protect bondholders’
investment in an underlying bond, called the reference obligation. Therefore, if a bondholder
is concerned that the bond issuer, or reference entity may default, he can either take a short
position in the bond or buy CDS protection on the bond. In the case of a default, the CDS
seller is bound to compensate the bondholder for the value against which he has bought CDS
protection. Because the CDS acts as a type of insurance on the underlying bond, the value of
the premium is derived from the underlying credit risk of the protected bond. The higher the
default risk of the bond, the higher is the annual premium (also called CDS price or CDS
spread) the purchaser must pay the seller. Thus, bond and CDS prices should be related since
conceptually, it is the same credit risk that is traded on them. When an asset is traded in a
single market, its price is solely determined in that market, however if it is traded in two
different markets as is in the case with sovereign CDS and bonds, then the price discovery
process may either be split between two markets or one market may dominate the other in
which case it would be considered more efficient in pricing credit risk.

21

‘sCDS’ for sovereign credit default swaps
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Against that backdrop, this essay studies which market, the emerging sovereign CDS
or bond, is more efficient in impounding new information by measuring their relative
contributions towards the price discovery process (PDP, hereafter) related to sovereign credit
risk. In doing so, it examines how these two markets dynamically interact with each other in
the long-run. Though this topic has been researched in the price discovery literature, unlike
with the corporate sector where the CDS market’s domination over the bond market has been
firmly documented, results in the sovereign sector have been mixed. While some studies
have documented the bond market’s domination, others have reported the CDS market’s
domination while still others suggest a two-way dynamic interactive effect between these
markets. However, in recent times most of the focus in this area has been on Eurozone
developed countries due to the ongoing euro crisis, resulting in the need to update and
reexamine emerging sovereign entities. This need is underscored all the more by recent
events such as China’s financial meltdown in the year 2015, the impact of reduced oil prices
on emerging countries like Russia, Venezuela etc., and the executive order issued by the
Puerto Rican governor’s office declaring a moratorium on a portion of debt on 30th June
201622. Because the credit risk associated with such events is traded in both the sovereign
CDS and underlying cash bond markets, thorough investigation of the price discovery
process related to this risk is essential in understanding how these markets operate and which
one may be more efficient in pricing in the risk.
As such, this paper contributes to the extant literature in four ways by i) adjudicating
the ongoing debate regarding market efficiency in pricing of sovereign credit risk, ii)

22

Puerto Rica was unable to meet its obligation to back the debt worth $2 billion due on 1st July 2016
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analyzing data over a much longer time period than has been done before23, thus enabling a
more fulsome study of the long-run dynamic interaction between two these markets, iii)
examining the persistence of the result by parsing the data into pre-crisis, post-crisis and
crisis period subsamples, and iv) operationalizing two price discovery measures for the first
time in the literature to test the robustness of the initial findings24.
Before the financial crisis it was generally understood that economic outlooks of
emerging markets should be more scrutinized than developed countries as emerging markets
might be more susceptible to domestic and global financial shocks. Therefore, pre-crisis
sovereign CDS (sCDS, hereafter) were mainly traded on emerging market bonds, with the
pricing on developed market bonds based on interest rate and liquidity risk only (Fontana &
Scheicher, 2010). However, after the crisis, sCDS trading on developed country bonds
increased substantially, thus providing a fertile area to study for the researchers. This resulted
in a plethora of studies examining the pricing of credit risk in the Eurozone area. However,
given that almost all credit markets witnessed a significant shift in the pricing of default risk
after the crisis, an updated study of the dynamic interaction between sCDS and bond credit
spreads is necessary, as called for by Li and Huang (2011)25.
Moreover, the model employed in informational efficiency studies between the CDS
and bond markets, the Vector Error-Correction Model (VECM), which up until this point has
been used to examine relatively short periods of time, is best suited for longer-period time
series data. This is because the main element of the VECM is the co-efficient of error
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Data spans from 2nd January 2006 to 21st April 2016 in this paper. On the other hand; most studies have
analyzed only three to four years of data.
24
Usually studies in the area of sovereign credit risk price discovery only report Gonzalo and Granger (1995)
measure of price discovery. However, in studies pertaining to corporate CDS few have reported both Gonzalo
and Granger (1995) and Hasbrouck (1995).
25
Their study covers the period from 01 Jan 2004 – 31 Jul 2008
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correction terms, which determines in the “long-run” which market impounds information
more efficiently. Therefore, by definition, a fulsome study of the dynamic interaction of
emerging market sCDS and bond spread designed to settle the question of which market is
more efficient requires long periods of quality data.
To the best of my knowledge, the most recent such comparative study of these
markets was conducted by Coudert and Gex (2013), whose data only covered the time period
from 02 January 2007 to 18 March 2010. As a result, it does not capture the recent changes in
the dynamics of price discovery as outlined by Fontana and Scheicher (2010). Moreover, the
authors only reported results for the overall sample using panel analysis and did not include
country-level findings. However, country-level results are a critical component of emerging
country price discovery studies since single name CDS comprise 95% of the outstanding
notional amount of sCDS and as such, provide the level of details regarding market
interaction most practical for credit investors. Finally, while there are two traditional price
discovery measures26 that can be employed in CDS-bond efficiency examinations, namely
the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) and Hasbrouck (1995)27 measures, extant studies typically
only employ one, the GG-1995. However, given that the two measures sometimes produce
conflicting findings, both should be utilized in any study of informational efficiency, with
one serving as a robustness check for the other.
In this study, I find that long-run interaction between these two markets only occurs
during periods of relative calm, as no such interaction is observed during the crisis period.
Moreover, my results indicate that when the interaction is present, the CDS market is more
efficient in the pricing of sovereign credit risk as per the GG-1995, its median contribution

26
27

Which will be discussed in detail in the methodology section
GG-1995 and HAS-1995, hereafter
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toward price discovery is more than 70%28. Furthermore, in all periods in which an
interactive effect is observed, there is no two-way effect, indicating that while the bond
market adjusts to information impounded in the CDS market, the opposite does not occur.
The only exception to this finding is Mexico, where the bond market is observed to lead the
CDS market during periods of tranquility. As reasons for the generally greater price
efficiency of the sCDS market, I cite the higher relative liquidity of the market and associated
greater level of information impounded.

2.2 Literature Review
Price discovery studies have their roots in the theoretical papers of Duffie (1999) and
J. C. Hull and White (2000)29 who suggest that the CDS price should be equivalent to the
credit spread of a floating-rate note traded at par over a risk-free interest rate. Therefore the
CDS-bond “basis” – the difference between the CDS price and yield spread of the underlying
bond— should be equal to zero. If not, there would be an arbitrage opportunity to earn
riskless profit. Using price differences in CDS premium and yield spread, basis traders can
implement an investment strategy to earn arbitrage profits. If the CDS price is narrower than
the underlying bond credit spread, i.e. “basis” is negative, then traders can go long the credit
and buy CDS protection to have a profitable default-free position (Fontana & Scheicher,
2010). This way they can pocket risk-less profit as bond will provide them net positive cash
flow even after paying for default-protection (CDS) on them. On the other hand if “basis” is
positive then they can gain arbitrage profit by shorting the underlying bond and selling
protection on that bond. Extant literature, in the area of sovereign entities, presents consistent
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These results are also supported by the HAS (1995) measure although the relative contribution is somewhat
lower at 63%
29
They develop the pricing model of CDS premium and also apply their model to evaluate the CDS traded on
Ashland Inc. at the close of trading day on 13th July 2000.
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empirical evidence of non-zero basis. These studies include, but are not limited to Ammer
and Cai (2011)30, Levy (2009), Fontana and Scheicher (2010), M. Adler and Song (2010) and
Arce, Mayordomo, and Peña (2013), among others. This deviation from the parity
relationship results due to market frictions namely counterparty risk, difference in liquidity,
cheapest-to-deliver option (CTD)31 and investor propensity to flight-to-quality during period
of stress.
Empirically observed violations of arbitrage relationship led to subsequent research to
investigate which market incorporates the information faster to efficiently price the default
risk of the underlying entity. The market which is quicker to incorporate the price of credit
risk is referred as “lead” market and is considered to contribute more towards the price
discovery process of default risk. The one, which follows the lead market in pricing the risk,
is called the “lag” market. Although there is deviation from the strict arbitrage relationship in
the short run, studies in both (corporate and sovereign CDS) find that CDS and bond credit
spreads move in tandem in the long run (Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005), Zhu (2006),
Baba and Inada (2009), Forte and Pena (2009), Norden and Weber (2009), Varga (2009),
Ammer and Cai (2011) and Coudert and Gex (2013)). This suggests that innovation in one
market can spill over to the other market and results in the co-movement of these spreads (in
other words they are co-integrated).
Most studies on the topic of dynamic interaction between CDS and bond spread have
been conducted on corporate CDS where researchers almost unanimously reached a
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This paper is written in 2007 but published in 2011.
CTD option gives the privilege to the protection buyer to deliver the lowest valued bond of an entity, in case
of credit event (default) pertaining to that entity, even if that CDS protection was not bought for that specific
bond. Thus, CTD option provides protection against all bonds of par maturity issued by the entity in case of
default event.
31
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consensus that the CDS market leads bond market in efficient pricing of credit risk (Li &
Huang, 2011). For example Blanco et al. (2005), Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005), Zhu
(2006), Forte and Pena (2009), among others; all study the aforementioned relationship and
the price discovery process of credit risk in CDS and bond markets using data on investment
grade entities. They find that CDS leads the bond market in terms of efficient pricing of
default risk. On the other hand, in the case of sovereign sCDS, findings of price discovery
studies on default risk are mixed (Augustin, 2014). For example Chan-Lau and Kim (2004),
Fontana and Scheicher (2010), and Hassan et al. (2011b)32 report mixed and conflicting
findings regarding the dominance of any particular market in pricing the default risk. The
sCDS market is different than corporate CDS market. For example, in the corporate CDS
market, the credit prices are determined based on both public and private information but in
the case of sCDS, only publicly available information drives credit risk determination.
Likewise, in the case of corporations, measurement of credit risk relies on key variables such
as industrial characteristics, management competency, asset to debt ratio etc. For sovereign
entities, these measurement criteria are not applicable to compute their default risk.
Therefore, the sovereign CDS market is distinctive and results of the studies on their
dynamic interaction between CDS and bond spread differ from those of corporate studies.
In general, the first major study of the efficient pricing of credit risk involved
corporate entities and was conducted by Blanco et al. (2005). Using data from 2nd Jan 2001 to
20th June 2002, they test the no-arbitrage relation between CDS spread and bond spread for
33 North American and European high-investment grade firms. They find that CDS market
contributes, on an average, 80% towards price discovery of credit risk. Thus their main
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Though out of seven countries they analyzed, bond market leads CDS market in terms of price discovery of
default risk
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finding suggests that CDS market indisputably lead bond market in determining the default
premium. Forte and Pena (2009) also find that CDS market leads bond market as price
discovery of credit risk mainly takes place in CDS market. Using the dataset for 17 nonfinancial European and North American firms from 12 September 2001 to 25 June 2003 they
also find that equity market is most superior, in efficiently pricing the credit risk, followed by
the CDS market. Furthermore, their study highlights the existence of time variation in market
information share of all the capital markets and raises the importance of sub-sample analysis.
From 1st Jan 1999 to 31st Dec 2002, Zhu (2006) analyzed 55 corporate entities’ CDS and
bond spread and finds that CDS moves ahead of bond spread. In short extant literature in the
area involving corporate entities unanimously report the superior informational
characteristics of the CDS spread compared to the bond spread in pricing the default risk of
the entity.
Regarding studies involving sovereigns, Li (2009) investigates the hedging capability
of sovereign CDS, using data from 1999 to 2002, over the credit risk of underlying traded
government bonds. He finds the lack of contribution of CDS market in pricing the credit risk
and confirms the lag of one week in price adjustment of credit risk in CDS market in
response to bond market. Thus, he concludes that the sovereign CDS market is not
informational efficient in measuring credit risk. This finding about total domination of bond
market in measuring the credit risk is not surprising at all as the CDS market was nascent
back in 1999, thus investors might still have staunchly followed the bond market to proxy for
default premium.
Ammer and Cai (2011)33 tested the efficient pricing of credit risk in sovereign CDS
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Study was conducted in 2007 but published in 2011.
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and bond market for nine emerging countries from 26th February 2001 to 31st March 2005
and report relatively mixed results about the dominance of any particular market. However,
among seven countries where authors confirm the long-run relationship between two time
series, they conclude that the CDS spread only marginally leads the bond spread (page#382).
This contribution of CDS series is significantly smaller than what Blanco et al. (2005) have
reported in their study of corporate entities i.e., 58% vs.80% contribution, on average. Their
study is unique as before this publication research in the area was primarily focused on
investment grade corporate entities and this was the first article written on efficient credit risk
pricing of emerging sovereign entities (page 370). They also analyzed the impact of
cheapest-to-deliver (CTD)34 option, incorporated in CDS contract, on the spread of
derivatives and found that as the sovereign entity becomes riskier, sCDS spread increased
more than one-to-one in relation to bond spread. Therefore, when credit risk increases or
distance to default decreases, then it would be more likely that CDS would be in-the-money
and protection buyer will exercise the CTD option of CDS (similar to put option on the
underlying asset). This indeed results in steeper slope of CD-BS relationship where CDS
spread increases more than the increase in credit spread of underlying bond. This may result
in positive CDS basis35 for sovereign entities with low rating and high yield offerings in their
study. They attribute the price leadership to the liquidity factor of the market.
Li and Huang (2011) examine the price discovery process of credit risk of sovereign
emerging entities between January 2004 and July 2008 and find that CDS market have shown
tremendous improvement –though bond market is still marginally ahead in efficiently pricing
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Details given in the footnote# 13 earlier.
CDS basis is the difference between the CDS premium and bond spread which suggests the price of the credit
risk of the bond.
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the default risk— in contributing towards the price discovery process of the risk compared to
what previous studies had reported. They attribute it to the increase in the development of
CDS trading on sovereign debt in the aftermath of the financial crisis and availability of
better quality CDS data in recent years. Li and Huang (2011) also suggest further
investigation towards exploring the interaction between sCDS and bond market in order to
update the literature on informational efficiency of these markets towards credit risk pricing
down the lane (page 223).
Within the context of the financial crisis, Coudert and Gex (2013) analyze sCDS and
bond spread of 18 sovereign (including eight emerging countries) and 17 financial entities in
panel regression. They find that in case of financial institutions and high-yield sovereigns,
CDS market leads bond market in efficient pricing of default risk. However, the opposite is
true for low-yield sovereigns. The authors attribute their findings to the liquidity of relative
markets and assert that the more liquid market leads the other market in terms of efficient
pricing of risk. They further find that the role of the CDS market as a leader in price
discovery amplifies during financial crisis as more participants express their thoughts in an
efficient way about true price of default risk in CDS market during turmoil. The main
drawback of their paper, along with short time-period, is that they did not provide country
level results about price leadership between two spreads. Country level results are more
useful as 95% of sCDS market is comprised of single name CDS. Therefore, hedge funds
managers, reporting dealers, regulators and other stakeholders may be more interested in
country level findings.
Using weekly frequency data for emerging countries from January 2004 to October
2009, Hassan et al. (2011b) find mixed results and do not conclude that any particular market
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dominates the other market in efficient pricing of the credit risk. Likewise, Aktug, Nayar, and
Vasconcellos (2013) report mixed results and find that in some cases the CDS market lead
but in others, bond market leads. The main issue with their study could be an “asynchronous
data bias” as they have used daily data for CDS spreads and monthly data to construct bond
spreads. This is acknowledged by the authors (page 253, footnote#2) and they suggest future
studies could be conducted using daily data for both series (page 258). In short, studies in the
area on emerging markets have mainly reported mixed results, though with the development
and maturity of sCDS market the role of CDS market in pricing the sovereign credit risk has
improved substantially.
Apart from the studies on emerging countries, recent research has focused on
studying the relationship in developed countries. Developed sovereign entities are different
from their emerging counterparts due to differences in macroeconomic conditions. The
importance of the sCDS market in developed countries increased after the financial crisis as
prior beliefs about the sovereign credit risk of these countries were optimistic. In fact
underlying sovereign bonds of developed countries were considered as risk-free assets and
therefore the sCDS market was not very developed for these sovereign entities. Results of
developed countries are also not definitive as few studies recognize the dominance of the
CDS market, but few others find bond market leads CDS market. Varga (2009), and Delis
and Mylonidis (2011) reported CDS market being the lead market but Coudert and Gex
(2013) and Arce, Mayordomo, and Peña (2011) find the dominance of bond market in price
discovery process of sovereign credit risk. In sum, unlike studies on corporate entities where
CDS spread leads bond spread, studies on sovereign entities report mixed results. However,
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after the crisis emphasis was given to advanced sovereign countries and not much research
was conducted on emerging sovereign entities.

2.3 Hypothesis Development
Based on the theoretical framework which proposes that CDS and bond credit spread
move in tandem with each other in the long-run and share a common stochastic trend with
non-zero bond basis (Blanco et al. (2005), Zhu (2006), Baba and Inada (2009), Varga (2009),
Carboni (2011), Hassan, Ngene, and Yu (2011a), Aktug et al. (2013), Coudert and Gex
(2013), among others), I propose the following:
H1: sCDS spread and bond spread will be co-integrated in the long run with non-zero CDSbond basis
Unlike corporate CDS, where existing literature consistently repot the superior
informational content of CDS spread over bond spread in pricing credit risk, studies in
sovereign CDS report mixed findings. Though recent studies report the improved role of
sCDS in efficient pricing of default risk, e.g. Li and Huang (2011) etc., but its domination in
setting the credit risk’s price has not yet been firmly established owing to conflicting results
reported in extant literature.
To participate in the CDS market, investors do not immediately need to outlay cash,
therefore more participants should express their thoughts with relative ease without much
barrier. This should actually result in quick impounding of information in sCDS prices which
suggests that it must be more efficient in pricing the risk. However due to widely reported
mixed results in this area of research and following Ammer and Cai (2011), Li and Huang
(2011), Hassan et al. (2011a) and among others, I do not specifically propose any single
hypothesis. Hence, I propose the following hypotheses:
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H2 (a): sCDS market will lead bond market in efficient pricing of credit risk and will
contribute more to the price discovery process of default risk between two markets.
H2 (b): Bond market will lead sCDS market in efficient pricing of credit risk and will
contribute more to the price discovery process of default risk between two markets.
H2 (c): There could be an equal magnitude of feedback between two markets while efficiently
setting the price of credit risk.

2.4 Data and Methodology
I have performed the empirical analysis on eight emerging countries i.e., Brazil,
Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Russia, Turkey and Venezuela. Selection of these
countries is contingent on the availability of sCDS and underlying bond yield data with 5years to maturity36. Data for these countries is collected and processed from January 2006 to
April 2016 from Bloomberg except for Panama and Peru. In the case of Panama I have not
been able to interpolate the bond yield spread data beyond 4th October 2010 and data for Peru
starts from 13th December 2006. Being synthetic, CDS contracts are available virtually in
unlimited quantities but this is not the case with bonds as they are issued only in limited
numbers. Therefore, following Blanco et al. (2005), Forte and Pena (2009), Levy (2009),
among others; I acquire the 5-year yield data by linear interpolation of the yields of two
sovereign bonds. One of which should have a maturity between three to five years and the
other’s maturity should fall within five to seven years, for each trading day from 02nd January
2006 to 21st April 2016.

36

I use CDS and bond yield data with 5-year maturity because CDS with 5 years maturity is the most liquid
instrument traded in the CDS market. This has also been widely used by the extant literature in this area.
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While selecting the bonds to create yield-to-maturity data of 5-year maturity bonds
for each trading day, all CUSIPs of the bonds maturing between 01st January 2009 and 21st
April 2023 are collected for aforementioned eight emerging countries from the Bloomberg.
While collecting the CUSIPs I have ensured the following criteria:
1) Bonds must not have any specific conditions, like they must not be a) callable, b)
puttable, or c) convertibles. Therefore, only bullet bonds are considered to
interpolate the yield data.
2) Bonds must not be a) securitized, b) structured, or c) subordinated.
3) Bonds must be issued in US Dollar and have fixed rate coupons, and
4) The issue must not be a private placement.
The time span of data analyzed for eight countries is given in table 2.1.
Finally 5-year swap rate is subtracted from the yield-to-maturity of 5-year bond for
each trading day for every country to construct a time series of bond credit spread. Swap rate
is used as proxy for risk-free rate as many studies argue that instead of treasury rates they are
actually considered as risk-free rate by market participants. These studies include but are not
Table 2.1: Time span of CDS and bond spread data used for each country in first essay

Countries
Brazil
Colombia
Mexico
Panama
Peru
Russia
Turkey
Venezuela

Data span
02nd January 2006 to 21st April 2016
02nd January 2006 to 21st April 2016
02nd January 2006 to 21st April 2016
02nd January 2006 to 04th October 2010
13th December 2006 to 21st April 2016
02nd January 2006 to 21st April 2016
02nd January 2006 to 21st April 2016
02nd January 2006 to 21st April 2016

limited to Blanco et al. (2005), Forte and Pena (2009), Fontana and Scheicher (2010),
Ammer and Cai (2011), among others. Daily time series of CDS and bond spreads with 5year maturity are plotted for every country and shown in the figure 2.1.
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The extant literature (Baba & Inada, 2009; Blanco et al., 2005; Coudert & Gex, 2013; Forte
& Pena, 2009; Zhu, 2006) among others, generally use reduced form vector autoregressive
(VAR) model with error correction term [also called vector error correction model (VECM)]
to measure the long-run dynamic interaction between these two related markets. VECM is
based on the statistical concept of a co-integration between two non-stationary time series.
Irrespective of the fact that two time series are individually non-stationary I(1) but if, in the
long-run, any specific linear combination between them is stationary I(0) then these time
series are considered co-integrated and, therefore, one can empirically employ VECM to
analyze the dynamic relation between them. Because of the theoretical relationship between
CDS and BS time series37 —as CDS-basis needs to be zero under strict arbitrage relation or
given market frictions at least they should move in tandem with each other with non-zero
basis— VECM seems to be an appropriate choice to study the lead-lag role between these
non-stationary series over longer period of time.
The theoretical relationship between two markets will be given by the following
regression equation:
CDSi,t = α0 + α1 BSi,t + ԑi,t

(1)

Where ‘CDSi,t’ and ‘BSi,t’ are the CDS and bond spread of country ‘i’ at time ‘t’,
respectively. Theoretically, given both time series are I(1), a long-run relationship (LRSHP)
should hold between them or in other words there exist unique ‘α0’ and ‘α1’ such that ԑi,t=
CDSi,t - α0 - α1 BSi,t is I(0). In this way I consider CDS and bond credit spread co-integrated.
Ideally, in this case,‘α0’ should be theoretically zero and ‘α1’ should be equal to one if a
parity relation holds between two time series as both represent the same credit risk for

37

Aforementioned studies mostly report these time series as I(1).
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Figure 2.1: Daily time series of CDS and bond spreads for eight countries
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Sovereign CDS premiums and bond spread. This figure plots the time series of 5-year USD denominated sovereign CDS prices and
bond spreads (calculated after deducting the 5-year risk-free swap from yield to maturity of 5-year bonds). Data is from 2nd Jan 2006 to
21st Apr 2016 except for Panama (Peru) where data ends (starts) on 4th Oct 2010 (13th Dec 2016).
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sovereign entity ‘i’ in two different markets. In simple words, if there is one unit movement
in ‘BSi,t’ in either direction then there should be a movement of equal magnitude in an
identical direction in ‘CDSi,t’ under strict arbitrage relation. Therefore, under parity relation
both series should be co-integrated with a co-integration vector [1, α1= -1, α0= 0].
However, due to market frictions this theoretical relation does not hold and a
researcher may find a co-integrated relationship between ‘CDSi,t’ and ‘BSi,t’ with ‘α0≠ 0’
and/or ‘α1≠ 1’. Whenever, there will be any deviation from this long-term relationship of CDS
and BS series then either one series or both subsequently adjust in up-coming periods, in
order to restore the equilibrium relationship. This brings us to an interesting research
question of which market, on average, reveals the true price of the credit risk more efficiently
by quickly impounding new information. The market which will significantly adjust in
subsequent periods, after the deviation from the LRSHP is triggered, will be considered as
less efficient as it adjusts to the publicly available information in the other market. The other
market will be considered as the lead market as it is efficiently pricing the credit risk and
responsible for the actual deviation from equilibrium relationship. This dynamic interaction
of the LRSHP of CDS and BS can be empirically modeled through VECM, a restricted
vector autoregressive (VAR) with error correction term, and given by the following set of
system equations:
ΔCDSi,t = λ 1 (ԑ i,t-1) + ∑kj=1 βj ΔCDSt-j + ∑kj=1 δjΔBSt-j +u1i,t
ΔBSi,t = λ 2 (ԑ i,t-1) + ∑kj=1 βj ΔCDSt-j + ∑kj=1 δjΔBSt-j +u2i,t

(2)

The VECM model in the system of equations consists of two parts. First an ‘error
correction term’ which represents the deviation from the LRSHP in the previous trading day
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and second, the lagged first order differences (Δ) of CDS and BS series. In system of
equations (2), u1i,t and u2i,t are i.i.d. residuals and ԑ i,t-1= CDSi,t-1 - α1 BSi,t-1 - α0 is an error
correction term and treated as deviation, between CDS and BS, from the LRSHP. Here the
co-integration co-efficients of the two series are embedded in the error correction term and
normalized into a vector [1, α1, α0]. First restriction of [1, α1= -1, α0≠ 0] is imposed on the cointegration vector to check whether spreads in both markets move by the same magnitude. If
null of α1= -1 is not rejected then VECM is applied with the same imposed restriction
otherwise VECM is applied by using the vector [1, α1≠ -1, α0≠ 0].
In the case of disequilibrium from long-run relationship, I am interested in
determining the magnitudes and signs of ‘λ 1’ and ‘λ 2’ which are error correction coefficients
and would help me to examine which market is the leader in efficiently pricing the credit
risk. ‘λ 1’ and ‘λ 2’ can be considered as speed of adjustment of CDS and BS series,
respectively, which bring respective markets back to equilibrium in current period (t) after
deviation from the LRSHP is observed in the previous trading day (t-1). If | α1|>=1 (| α1|<1),
it means that the level of CDS is higher (lower) than the level necessary to keep the system in
equilibrium in period ‘t-1’ and to bring the pair of series back to equilibrium, in current
period ‘t’, CDS spread should decrease (increase) and/or BS should increase (decrease). That
is, ‘λ 1’ < 0 (‘λ 1’ > 0) and ‘λ 2’ > 0 (‘λ 2’ < 0). If only one of the lambda has the correct sign
and is statistically significant, it suggests that only one market is efficiently contributing
towards the price discovery process of the sovereign credit risk and the series which adjusts
significantly does not lead the process. Thus, if λ 1(λ 2) is statistically significant then bond
(CDS) market will lead the price discovery process of credit risk and CDS (cash) market will
adjust to remove pricing error observed in the previous trading day. Both markets will
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contribute towards the efficient pricing of credit risk if both lambdas are significantly
different than zero.
If co-integration does not exist between the two time series then I have only used the
second part, listed in the system of equations (2), and totally omit the error correction term.
Such models, are called VAR models. VAR models are designed to capture the joint
dynamics among multiple time series. They are the system of multiple linear equations where
each endogenous variable is a function of lagged values of all endogenous variables in the
system including its own lags. Therefore, in order to determine whether VAR or VECM
should be used one needs to go through two steps. In the first step, determine whether both
series are non-stationary. In the second step (if the answer to the first step is affirmative)
determine if both series are co-integrated?
Due to the low power of the Augmented Dickey Fuller test in rejecting the unit root, I
have also used the Phillips-Perron test to test the presence of unit root of each series for every
country. Once non-stationarity is established for each pair of series for eight countries I have
conducted the Johansen co-integration test to determine the linear combination between
them; which should be I(0) if both series hold LRSHP, and therefore are co-integrated. Once
both conditions are satisfied I have conducted VECM to determine the nature of dynamic
interaction between both series. Else, I have adopted VAR to capture the joint dynamics
between CDS and BYS series. In case of VAR, Granger Causality test is conducted. In this
case, the null hypothesis is the joint test that all the lagged variables of CDS do not Grangercause BS and are given as under:
𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = 𝛽3 = 𝛽4 … … … … = 𝛽𝑘 = 0
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Likewise the joint test that all the lagged variables of BS does not Granger-cause
CDS is given as follows:
𝛿1 = 𝛿2 = 𝛿3 = 𝛿4 … … … … = 𝛿𝑘 = 0
Like any econometric model, VECM needs to be properly specified i.e., the number
of lags need to be determined before using these models. Two widely used information
criteria in choosing lags are Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) and Schwarz Information
Criteria (SIC). While choosing for appropriate lags through aforementioned criteria I have
also controlled for serial correlation of error terms in the system of equations (Fung, Sierra,
Yau, and Zhang (2008); Wooldridge (2010)). However, there is no universal approach in
selecting the information criteria for choosing the appropriate number of lags. Forte and Pena
(2009) and Ammer and Cai (2011) along with others have used SIC. On the other hand,
Blanco et al. (2005), Carboni (2011) and Avino and Cotter (2014) have used AIC. I would
use SIC to select the optimal number of lags as it suggests parsimonious model and penalize
for having additional lags if they unnecessarily reduce degree of freedom without
contributing much in determining the unbiased coefficients of error correction terms in
Vector Error Correction Model.
Finally, I have used two traditional methods of price discovery; both of which rely on
VECM. These two popular common factor models are Gonzalo and Granger (1995) and
Hasbrouck (1995)38. HAS (1995) assumes that price volatility reflects new information, and
therefore the market which contributes more to the variance of innovation of common trend
is also deemed to contribute most to the price discovery ((Blanco et al., 2005). On the other
hand, GG (1995) suggests that market which adjusts least to the price movements in the other

38

Hereafter GG (1995) and HAS (1995), respectively.
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market is deemed to be more efficient and leads the price discovery process. Most of the
price discovery studies involving corporate CDS and cash markets report the results of both
methods ((Blanco et al., 2005; Forte & Pena, 2009), but sovereign studies usually report
results of GG (1995) only ((Ammer & Cai, 2011; Coudert & Gex, 2013)). I have reported the
results of both methods which would be an additional contribution of this study to this strand
of literature involving sovereign entities. Using equation (2), according to GG (1995), the
contribution of the CDS market towards the price discovery process of default risk is given
as follows:
𝐺𝐺𝑐𝑑𝑠 =

λ2
⁄(λ − λ )
2
1

On the other hand, the average of lower bound and upper bound of the Hasbrouck
measure is used for determining the efficiency of a particular market in pricing the credit
risk. For CDS market contribution, Hasbrouck lower and upper bounds are given as under:

𝐻𝐴𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟,𝑐𝑑𝑠

2
𝜎12
⁄ 2)
𝜎2
= 2 2
λ2 𝜎1 − 2λ 1 λ 2 𝜎12 + λ12 𝜎22

λ22 (𝜎12 −

𝐻𝐴𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟,𝑐𝑑𝑠

λ 1 𝜎 12⁄ 2
𝜎1 )
= 2 2
λ2 𝜎1 − 2λ 1 λ 2 𝜎12 + λ12 𝜎22
(λ 2 𝜎 1 −

The variance-covariance matrix of u1i,t and u2,t is represented by 𝜎12 , 𝜎22 and 𝜎 12 . Due
to its construction, the informational share of the first variable used in the VECM system is
exaggerated (for details see Hasbrouck (1995)). Therefore, following the advice of Baillie,
Booth, Tse, and Zabotina (2002) I will report the average of these two bounds (HAS-MID).
The value of GG-1995 and HAS-MID will be bounded between 0 and 1. If the value of these
two measures will be more than 0.5 then it would suggest that a more than 50% contribution
towards credit risk pricing is done by sCDS market e.g. if the values of these two measures
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are 0.69 then it shows that a 69% contribution comes from sCDS market to the PDP of
sovereign credit risk.
Figure 2.2: Sequence of steps applied to use VAR or VECM methodology in first essay

Source: Author
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The summary of aforementioned steps is summarized in figure 2.2 which is
mentioned pictorially on the previous page that how author proceed to decide when to use
VAR or VECM.

2.5 Results
Descriptive statistics
Eight emerging countries have been selected for the purpose of analysis in this paper.
These sovereign entities include Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Russia, Turkey
and Venezuela39. CDS and bond yield spread (yield-to-maturity) data has gathered using the
procedure mentioned under the data and methodology section. This data covers the time-span
from January 2nd, 2006 to April 21st, 2016 except for Panama and Peru. For Panama I have
not been able to construct the bond yield series beyond 4th Oct 2010 and for Peru data starts
from 13th Dec 200640. After subtracting the par maturity swap rate from bond yield data I
ended up getting bond credit spread (BS) which is the proxy of sovereign credit spread from
bond market. Table 2.2 presents the descriptive statistics for CDS and BS series for all eight
countries in an alphabetic order. First descriptive statistics are mentioned for CDS series for a
country followed by the BS series statistics. By looking at skewness and kurtosis measures
for both series of each country it can be clearly noticed that underlying stochastic data
generating process is not co-variance stationary. Thus, as we go through the time period data
seems to come through different underlying probability distribution functions. This evidence
supports the case of having non-stationary data series which can formally put to test using
unit root testing tools. Descriptive statistics show that Venezuela’s credit risk is the highest

39

Their selection is based on the availability of the data.
Thus data for all other countries is from 2nd January 2006 to 21st April 2016 except for Panama and Peru. For
Panama it is from 2nd January 2006 to 4th October 2010 and for Peru it is from 13th December 2006 to 21st April
2016.
40
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and most volatile among the countries analyzed. Controversial policies of President Nicholas
Maduro make the case for such high credit risk of Venezuela as CDS prices have crossed the
mark of 9,500 basis points in 2015. On an average CDS buyer needs to pay 14.44% (1,444
basis points) to protect the value of Venezuelan bond which is very high compared to other
countries in our analysis. For other countries this percentage ranges from a mere 1.23% (for
Mexico) to 2.16% (for Turkey).
Unit root testing
After suspecting non-stationarity in the credit risk series (CDS and BS) of every country I
have formally conducted the unit root test for each one of them. I have used Augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test whose null hypothesis suggests that there is a unit root and series is
not stationary. If the null is rejected at 5% level of significance then I can conclude that a
particular series is stationary. While using ADF, SIC is used to determine the optimal lag
selection. Due to the low power of this test I have complemented the findings of the ADF test
with that of the Phillpis-Perron (PP) unit root test. One advantage of PP test over ADF is that
one does not need to give lags to test the unit root. Result of unit root testing is presented in
table 2.3.
Results of ADF and PP tests show that both CDS and BS series are non-stationary for each
country as null hypothesis of the unit root of these tests have not been rejected at 5% level of
significance. In the case of CDS-bond basis series, tests suggest the presence of stationarity
across the board except for Venezuela. This refers to the fact, that apart from Venezuela,
given I would establish a co-integration relationship between CDS and BS series for all
countries, I may employ VECM model to determine which market is efficient and dominates
the process of sovereign credit risk price discovery (PDP) in the long-term.

43
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of daily CDS and bond spreads data

BRCDS
BRBS
CLCDS
CLBS
MXCDS
MXBS
PNCDS
PNBS
PECDS
PEBS
RSCDS
RSBS
TKCDS
TKBS
VNCDS
VNBS

Descriptive Statistics for CDS and Bond Spread Series (Jan 2006-Apr 2016)*
Mean
Median
Max.
Min. Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
Brazil
173.26
138.92
586.86
61.50
94.58
1.86
5.92
123.80
89.60
529.50
4.91
103.30
1.67
5.27
153.25
143.73
122.95
78.53
158.61
140.83
143.11
106.12
210.32
176.82
216.49
210.59
1444.56
1212.72

Obs
2689
2689

134.91
120.75

Colombia
598.66
64.70
593.72
3.90

70.14
85.27

2.31
1.86

9.62
7.20

2689
2689

111.38
54.50

Mexico
601.21
28.17
552.30
-48.55

71.58
74.11

2.33
2.04

10.54
8.47

2689
2689

129.67
106.77

Panama
586.86
61.33
728.67
22.80

91.21
119.29

1.93
2.23

6.34
8.23

1241
1241

128.68
92.11

Peru
59.66
-16.10

66.10
79.95

2.69
2.49

11.87
11.17

2442
2442

169.66
161.45

Russia
1113.38
36.88
628.30
19.69

154.95
86.42

2.01
1.59

8.13
6.89

2689
2689

196.62
193.20

Turkey
831.31
110.95
1000.70
54.55

76.24
102.43

2.25
2.18

11.74
10.95

2689
2689

Venezuela
9834.90
117.63 1502.33
4055.40 -948.83
956.19

1.97
1.26

6.32
3.91

2689
2689

988.86
1029.75

586.28
552.35

*All data is from 2nd January 2006 to 21st April 2016, except in the case of Panama and Peru. In the case of Panama
data ends on 4 October 2010 and for Peru data starts from 13 December 2006.

Co-integration tests
Once it has been established that both credit risk series exhibit unit root, I have formally
tested for the presence of co-integration relationship between them using the Johansen test
for co-integration. Co-integration suggests that though individual series are non-stationary
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any linear combination between them must be stationary. Simply put, these series move in
tandem with each other and the distance between them exhibits stationarity.
Table 2.3: Unit root test results of daily CDS, bond, and basis spreads (full sample)

Unit Root Test for CDS, BS and CDS-bond Basis ( Jan 2006 - Apr 2016)
CDS Spread
Bond Spread
CDS basis
Country
ADF
PP
ADF
PP
ADF
PP
Brazil

I(1)

I(1)

I(1)

I(1)

I(0)

I(0)

Colombia

I(1)

I(1)

I(1)

I(1)

I(0)

I(0)

Mexico

I(1)

I(1)

I(1)

I(1)

I(0)

I(0)

Panama

I(1)

I(1)

I(1)

I(1)

I(0)

I(0)

Peru

I(1)

I(1)

I(1)

I(1)

I(0)

I(0)

Russia

I(0)

I(1)

I(1)

I(1)

I(0)

I(0)

Turkey

I(1)

I(1)

I(1)

I(1)

I(0)

I(0)

Venezuela

I(1)

I(1)

I(1)

I(1)

I(1)

I(1)

Results of Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) are given in this table for CDS, BS
and CDS-bond basis series. CDS-bond basis is the difference between CDS and BS and this series needs
to be stationary if I intend to use VECM model on CDS and BS series to find which market is more
efficient in incorporating new information. Data is from 2nd Jan 2006 to 21st Apr 2016 for all series,
except for Panama where date ends on 4th Oct 2010 and Peru where it starts from 13th Dec 2006.
Results suggest that both ADF and PP tests are unable to reject the null hypothesis of unit root for both
credit risk series for each country at 5% level of statistical significance. Therefore, suggesting that both
series are non-stationary for each country. In the case CDS-bond basis both tests have rejected the null of
unit root for all countries except in the case of Venezuela where tests suggest the presence of stationarity
(mentioned in bold).

The maximum of one co-integration rank (co-integration relationship) can exist between two
series. Results of Johansen test for co-integration is given in table 2.4; second column of the
table mentions the trace statistics of aforementioned test with corresponding p-values. Here,
null hypothesis is that co-integration rank is zero i.e. there does not exist any relationship
between two series. Clearly this null is rejected for all countries except for Venezuela,
mentioned in bold, where trace statistics is 8.07 with a p-value of 0.46. This suggests that
apart from Venezuela a common trend exists between both credit risk series for all the
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countries thus referring to the fact that both markets are following the same fundamentals and
pricing the credit risk similarly.
Table 2.4: Co-integration test on CDS and bond spreads (full sample)

Co-integration Test on CDS and BS Series (Jan 2006 to Apr 2016)
Null hypothesis
Zero co-integration vector (P-value) Co-integration vector is [1,-1,c] (P-value)
Brazil
Colombia
Mexico
Panama*
Peru**
Russia
Turkey
Venezuela

26.25 (0.00)
23.98 (0.00)
31.36 (0.00)
20.73 (0.00)
44.01 (0.00)
23.80 (0.00)
33.16 (0.00)
8.07 (0.46)

1.51 (0.22)
0.44 (0.51)
0.07 (0.79)
4.46 (0.03) α1= 1.07***
0.72 (0.40)
3.13 (0.08) α1= 1.49***
2.23 (0.14)
N/A

* Data is from Jan 06 to Oct 10
** Data is from Dec 06 to Apr 16
Second column shows the results of trace statistics and their p-value (in brackets) of Johansen tests of co-integration which
is applied on CDS spread and bond spread of each country. SIC has used for lags selection. Results show that only in the
case Venezuela I am not able to reject the null hypothesis of no co-integration. In the third column restriction of [1,-1, c] is
applied on co-integration vector with non-zero constant. Results show that only in the case of Panama and Russia null
hypothesis of [1, α1= -1] is not rejected where slope parameter is greater than unity and significant at 1% level. For
Panama and Russia table mentions the empirical value of α1 is 1.07 and 1.49, respectively. N/A indicates that restriction
cannot be applied in the absence of a co-integrating vector.

Next step after establishing a co-integration relationship is to test the theoretical
values of co-integration vector by applying restriction on it. Under parity relation both series
should be co-integrated with a co-integration vector [1, 𝛼1 = -1, 𝛼0 = 0]. Meaning that values
of both of these series must be equal to each other as we move along the timeline. However,
this is a stringent restriction and I have applied a modified restriction with non-zero constant
as my proxy for risk-free rate is imperfect. Thus, I have applied a restriction of [1,-1] on the
co-integration vectors of all countries except Venezuela where I have already found no cointegration relation. This restriction means that whenever there is a unit increase in bond
spread then there is a corresponding increase in CDS price by the same magnitude. Results of
this restriction are mentioned in the third column of table 2.4 with respective p-values. Here
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null hypothesis suggests that there exists a co-integration vector [1,-1]. Results show that
except for Panama and Russia this restriction is applicable on all other countries. In the case
of Panama and Russia co-integration vector is reported as [1,-1.07] and [1,-1.49],
respectively. It appears that participants in the CDS market consider Panama and Russia’s
sovereign bonds very risky and increase in their credit risk in the bond market triggers acute
response in their CDS prices. Ammer and Cai (2011) claim that due to cheapest to deliver
(CTD) option embedded in CDS contracts we may have such co-integration vector as
increase in BS by one unit will likely to trigger an increase of credit risk price by more than
one unit in the CDS market. My findings on vector restriction are different than that of
Ammer and Cai (2011) as they found absence of [1,-1] restriction for all 7 countries included
in their sample with mean vector value of [1,-1.30] for all countries. Also, unlike them my
finding suggests that series are co-integrated for Russia since 200641. However, in the case of
Venezuela both studies suggest the absence of co-integration.
Price discovery measures using VECM
To determine which market is more efficient in pricing the credit risk of emerging
sovereign entities I have employed VECM on paired series where co-integration relation has
been established. SIC is employed as an optimal lag selection criteria. In equation two, first
part is an error correction term and ‘ԑ i,t-1’ represents the deviation from the long-term
relationship between CDS and BS series. In order to move back to the parity relationship
either CDS or BS or both needed to adjust in time ‘t’ by removing the discrepancy which is
encountered in period ‘t-1’. The signs and statistical significance of ‘λ1’ and ‘λ2’ actually
determine which market is the price leader and which market is the follower. If ‘|α1 |>1’ then

41

Ammer and Cai (2011) data ends on 31st March 2005

47
lambda-1 should be less than zero and/or lambda-2 should be greater than zero i.e., ‘λ 1< 0’
and/or ‘λ 2>0’. In other words if CDS series is above its co-integration level in period ‘t-1’
then in time ‘t’ either CDS series moves back towards BS series or BS moves up towards
CDS series or both should move towards each other to remove the discrepancy. If lambdas
will have wrong sign then series will not converge and co-integration relation will not be
observed. In case of ‘|α1 |<1’ one should have opposite values of lambdas to remove the
discrepancy to reinstate long-run relation in the following period i.e. ‘λ1> 0’ and/or ‘λ2<0’.
Results in table 2.5 show that both series converge for all countries in order to rectify the
deviation from long run relationship as, given |α1 |>1, λ1 is negative and λ2 is positive for all
countries. However, there is an interesting trend which can be observed that is for most
countries λ1 is not significant and λ2 is statistically significant at 1% level. This suggests that
mostly its bond spread series which adjust to restore the co-integration relation and thus,
follows the CDS market to price sovereign credit risk. CDS market seems to dominate the
bonds market in efficient pricing of credit risk as it is bond market which adjusts to publicly
available information. Only exceptions are Mexico and Turkey where it appears that bond
market is the price leader as CDS spread adjusts at 1% level of significance to the publicly
available information in its respective bond market. Also, in the case of Turkey there is a two
way interaction between both series as both converge significantly to remove the discrepancy
in the following period.
To exactly quantify the level of contribution each market made to the price discovery
process of sovereign credit risk over the period of January 2006 to April 2016, I have used
Gonzalo and Granger (1995) and Hasbrouck (1995) methods. Their results are given in table
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2.5, column six for GG (1995) and column nine for Hasbrouck (1995). GG measure mentions
the contribution of CDS market in discovering the credit risk of a country.
Table 2.5: CDS & bond market contribution to PDP of sovereign credit risk (full sample)

Contribution of CDS and Bond Markets to Price Dicovery Process from Jan 06 - Apr 16*
Hasbrouck
λ1

t-Statistic

λ2

t-Statistic GG (CDS) Lower

Upper Mid (CDS)

Brazil

-0.007

-1.49

0.021

3.51

74.60%

0.44

0.92

68.10%

Colombia

-0.003

-0.97

0.015

3.12

82.78%

0.57

0.94

75.73%

Mexico

-0.019

-3.81

0.005

0.95

21.65%

0.04

0.40

22.10%

Panama

-0.004

-0.54

0.030

2.54

89.08%

0.58

0.97

77.81%

Peru

-0.007

-1.61

0.019

3.96

73.86%

0.65

0.89

76.94%

Russia

-0.004

-1.62

0.007

3.62

62.13%

0.51

0.90

70.20%

Turkey

-0.012

-2.01

0.037

5.03

75.05%

0.51

0.92

71.25%

Mean
Median

68.45%
74.60%

0.47
0.51

0.85
0.92

66.02%
71.25%

Mean excluding Mexico
Median excluding Mexico

76.25%
74.83%

0.54
0.54

0.92
0.92

73.34%
73.49%

*Data for all countries starts from 2nd January 2006 to 21st April 2016 except for Panama and Peru. For Panama it
ends on 4th October 2010 and for Peru it starts from 13th December 2006. This table reports two widely used price
discovery measures i.e., Gonzalo and Granger (1995) and Hasbrouck (1995) along with upper and lower bound of the
Hasbrouck. These measures represent the contribution of CDS market in pricing the sovereign credit risk in long-run
and are calculated based on λ1 and λ2 obtained from following equation and restriction of α1 equals unity is imposed
except in the case of Panama and Russia:

ΔCDSi,t = λ 1 (CDSi,t-1 - α0 - α1 BSi,t-1) + ∑kj=1 βj ΔCDSt-j + ∑kj=1 δjΔBSt-j +u1i,t
ΔBSi,t = λ 2 (CDSi,t-1 - α0 - α1 BSi,t-1)) + ∑kj=1 βj ΔCDSt-j + ∑kj=1 δjΔBSt-j +u2i,t
𝐺𝐺 (𝐶𝐷𝑆) =

𝐻𝐴𝑆𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟,𝑐𝑑𝑠

2
𝜎12
⁄ 2)
𝜎2
= 2 2
λ2 𝜎1 − 2λ 1 λ 2 𝜎12 + λ12 𝜎22

λ22 (𝜎12 −

λ2
⁄(λ − λ )
2
1

𝐻𝐴𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑟,𝑐𝑑𝑠

λ 1 𝜎 12⁄ 2
𝜎1 )
= 2 2
λ2 𝜎1 − 2λ 1 λ 2 𝜎12 + λ12 𝜎22
(λ 2 𝜎 1 −

Finally HASmid,cds (last column in table-5) is simply the average of HASlower,cds and HASupper,cds .
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Highest contribution of CDS market in discovering credit risk is measured for
Panama where GG measure suggests 89.08% of the contribution is made by the derivative
market. On the other hand, though not statistically significant, only 21.65% contribution is
made in the case of Mexico by the derivative market. It means that among the countries in
our analysis CDS market is most efficient for Panama and most inefficient for Mexico. There
is one way interaction found between two markets for all countries except for Turkey where
both markets (as both lambdas of Turkey are significant) actively interact with each other in
pricing the credit risk. Hasbrouck measure supports the finding of GG measure and result
indicates that during the period of 2nd January 2006 to 21st April 2016 mean (median)
contribution towards price discovery of sovereign credit risk by derivative market is 68.45%
(74.60%) and 66.02% (71.25%) according to GG and Hasbrouck measures, respectively.
Further if we exclude Mexico, where cash market dominates the discovery process, then
mean contribution of derivative market increases to 76.25% according to GG measure and
73.34% according to Hasbrouck measure. Therefore, during the whole period CDS market is
more efficient in incorporating the new information and bond market adjusts itself to the
publicly available information in CDS market. This finding is in-line with the intuition that
market participants in derivative market can express their sentiments about the sovereign
credit risk more efficiently compared to cash market as they actually do not need to outlay
cash to express their opinion about sovereign credit risk.
Sovereign credit risk price discovery measures in pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis era
In their study of analyzing credit risk price discovery process among European stock,
bond and CDS markets, Forte and Pena (2009) find time varying contribution to price
discovery by different markets. Therefore, in order to determine whether the dominance of
derivative market changes over time I have conducted detailed subsample analysis. I have
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divided the time period in pre-crisis (period-1), crisis (period-2) and post-crisis (period-3)
time periods. Period-1 starts from 2nd Jan 2006 and ends on 12th Sept 2008 when Lehman
Brothers files for bankruptcy42. For crisis period (period-2) my data spans from 15th Sept
2008 to 31st Dec 200943. Finally period-3 starts from 1st Jan 2010 and ends on 21st Apr
201044. In order to use VECM to find which market efficiently prices credit risk during each
of these periods I have repeated the process which has performed earlier over the whole time
period for each country.
First unit tests have been conducted for CDS, BS and basis series and their results are
given in table 2.6 for all three periods. Apart from Russia, CDS and BS series for every
country have been found to be non-stationary during the pre-crisis period. During the same
period CDS-bond basis appears to be stationary except for Russia. Because Russia’s result
for period-1 is different than other countries, they are mentioned in bold in the table. Thus,
given formal co-integration test suggest that pair of credit risk series are co-integrated in
period-1, we can apply VECM on the CDS and BS series for each country (except Russia) to
determine which market contributes more efficiently to credit risk pricing.
For period-3 (post-crisis) table 2.6 suggest the same finding as both credit risk series
are I(1) and basis series is I(0) for every country including Russia. Therefore once cointegration will be established between CDS and BS, VECM can be applied to each pair of
credit risk series for all countries during period-3. However, during period-2 unit root tests’
findings on credit and basis series are quite different than other two periods. Here, either test
has rejected null of unit root for any of the credit risk series or unable to reject the null of unit

42

For Peru pre-crisis period start from 13th Dec 2006 and ends on 12th Sept 2008.
13th and 14th Sept 2008 were Saturday and Sunday, respectively.
44
For Panama post-crisis period starts from 1st Jan 2010 and ends on 4th Oct 2010.
43
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root for basis series. For example in the case of Brazil, on one hand both ADF and PP tests
have rejected the unit root presence for CDS and BS series but on the other hand also unable
to reject it for the CDS-bond basis series.
Table 2.6: Unit root test results of daily CDS, bond, and basis spreads (sub-samples)

Order of Integration of CDS and BS Series during pre-Crisis, Crisis and post-Crisis Periods
CDS spread
BS
CDS-Bond Basis
% of total
Period
observations
ADF
PP
ADF
PP
ADF
PP

Country
Brazil

Period-1
crisis Period-2
Period-3

26.22%
12.61%
61.18%

I(1)
I(0)
I(1)

I(1)
I(0)
I(1)

I(1)
I(0)
I(1)

I(1)
I(0)
I(1)

I(0)
I(1)
I(0)

I(0)
I(1)
I(0)

Colombia

Period-1
Period-2
Period-3

26.22%
12.61%
61.18%

I(1)
I(1)
I(1)

I(1)
I(1)
I(1)

I(1)
I(0)
I(1)

I(1)
I(0)
I(0)*

I(0)
I(0)
I(0)

I(0)
I(0)
I(0)

Mexico

Period-1
Period-2
Period-3

26.22%
12.61%
61.18%

I(1)
I(1)
I(1)

I(1)
I(0)
I(1)

I(1)
I(0)
I(1)

I(1)
I(0)
I(1)

I(0)
I(1)
I(0)

I(0)
I(1)
I(0)

Panama

Period-1
Period-2
Period-3

56.81%
27.32%
15.87%

I(1)
I(0)
I(1)

I(1)
I(0)
I(1)

I(1)
I(0)
I(1)

I(1)
I(0)
I(1)

I(0)
I(0)
I(0)

I(0)
I(0)
I(0)

Peru

Period-1
Period-2
Period-3

18.76%
13.88%
67.36%

I(1)
I(1)
I(1)

I(1)
I(0)*
I(1)

I(1)
I(1)
I(1)

I(1)
I(1)
I(1)

I(0)
I(1)
I(0)

I(0)
I(1)
I(0)

Russia

Period-1
Period-2
Period-3

26.22%
12.61%
61.18%

I(1)
I(1)
I(1)

I(1)
I(1)
I(1)

I(0)
I(1)
I(1)

I(1)*
I(1)
I(1)

I(1)
I(0)
I(0)

I(1)
I(0)
I(0)

Turkey

Period-1
Period-2
Period-3

26.22%
12.61%
61.18%

I(1)
I(0)
I(1)

I(1)
I(0)
I(1)

I(1)
I(0)
I(1)

I(1)
I(0)
I(1)

I(0)
I(0)
I(0)

I(0)
I(0)
I(0)

Venezuela

Period-1
Period-2
Period-3

26.22%
12.61%
61.18%

I(1)
I(1)
I(1)

I(1)
I(1)
I(1)

I(1)
I(0)
I(1)

I(1)
I(0)
I(1)

I(0)
I(1)
I(0)

I(0)
I(1)
I(0)

I(1) means the series is non-stationary and I(0) represents stationarity. *sign suggests that result of one unit test is different
than others. Here period-1(pre-crisis), period-2(crisis) and period-3(post-crisis) correspond to 01st Jan 2006 to 12th Sep 2008,
15th Sep 2008 to 31st Dec 2009 and 01st Jan 2010 to 21st Apr 2016, respectively. However in case of Panama period-3 refers to
01 Jan 2010 to 04 Oct 2010 and for Peru period-1 comprises of 13 Dec 2006 to 12 Sep 2008.

Findings of unit root tests are similar for all other countries except Russia where the
pair of credit risk series exhibits non-stationarity and basis series is found to be stationary.
Because in period-2 (crisis period) Russia’s finding is different than all other countries
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therefore it is mentioned in bold. Now, if a formal co-integration test suggests that CDS and
BS series are co-integrated for Russia in period-2 then VECM can be used to determine that
which market contributes heavily in pricing Russian credit risk during crisis. It appears that
VECM cannot be applied on the pair of credit risk series for other countries during period-2,
however formal test for co-integration is conducted on both spreads of every country during
period-2 and reported in panel ‘B’ of table 2.7.
Table 2.7 presents the results of Johansen test for co-integration on the pair of credit risk
series for each country for pre-crisis, crisis and post crisis periods in panels A, B and C,
respectively. In panel ‘A’ as expected null of no co-integration is not rejected for Russia.
This is expected because in table 2.6 it has already been reported that CDS-bond basis is not
stationary for Russia during the pre-crisis period. For Peru the co-integration vector is
reported as [1, α1= -1.37] which suggests that CDS market participants considered Peru’s
bonds more risky in pre-crisis duration compared to other countries as a unit increase in its
credit risk in the cash market triggered more than a unit increase (1.37 to be exact) in the
CDS market. The most interesting findings are reported for the crisis period in panel B. Apart
from Russia, both credit risk series are not co-integrated for any country during the crisis
period suggesting that there is an absence of common trend between them as they stop
following the same fundamentals. Both markets start pricing the sovereign credit risk
differently when panic hits the financial system. This also suggests that two different types of
participants with entirely opposite perceptions about credit risk are active in these markets;
one being active only in the CDS and the other in the bond market. Results of panel C reports
that once crisis period ends then this pair of credit risk series again start co-moving with each
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Table 2.7: Co-integration test of CDS and bond spreads (sub-samples)

Co-integration Test on CDS and BS Series Sub-periods
Null hypothesis
Zero co-integration vector (P-value) Co-integration vector is [1, -1] (P-value)
Panel-A
Brazil
Colombia
Mexico
Panama
Peru
Russia
Turkey
Venezuela

22.62 (0.00)
32.39 (0.00)
15.49 (0.04)
23.89 (0.00)
17.19 (0.02)
7.35 (0.54)
26.71 (0.00)
29.03 (0.00)

0.33 (0.56)
0.58 (0.44)
1.18 (0.28)
0.47 (0.49)
11.48 (0.00) α1= 1.37***
N/A
0.38 (0.53)
0.53 (0.47)

11.57 (0.13)
6.83 (0.60)
8.82 (0.38)
12.75 (0.12)
8.64 (0.40)
20.23 (0.00)
15.36 (0.06)
12.42 (0.14)

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
12.07 (0.00) α1= 1.89***
N/A
N/A

20.62 (0.00)
14.94 (0.06)
21.01 (0.00)
24.64 (0.00)
18.76 (0.02)
18.99 (0.01)
34.21 (0.00)
18.70 (0.02)

1.94 (0.16)
0.62 (0.43)
3.15 (0.08)
0.96 (0.33)
1.61 (0.21)
0.69 (0.40)
0.59 (0.44)
15.53 (0.00) α1= 1.72***

Panel-B
Brazil
Colombia
Mexico
Panama
Peru
Russia
Turkey
Venezuela
Panel-C
Brazil
Colombia
Mexico
Panama
Peru
Russia
Turkey
Venezuela

Second column shows the results of trace statistics and their p-value (in brackets) of Johansen test of cointegration which is applied on CDS spread and bond spread of each country. SIC has used as optimal lag
selection criteria. In the third column restriction of [1,-1, c] is applied on co-integration vector with non-zero
constant. Panel 'A' presents the results for pre-crisis period or period-1. Period-1 spans from 2nd Jan 2006 to
21st April 2016 except for Peru where its starts from 13th Dec 2006. Panel 'B' presents the result of crisis
period (period-2) and it spans from 15th Sept 2008 to 31st Dec 2009. Finally, Panel 'C' presents the results for
post-crisis period which starts from 1st Jan 2010 till 21st April 2016 except for Panama where it ends at 4th Oct
2010. Results show that during period-1 only in the case of Russia co-integration relation is not established
between the pair of credit risk series. And during crisis period only for Russia co-integration relation between
the CDS and bond market has established. Therefore, Russia seems unique in terms of findings of cointegration test. In post-crisis era co-integration relationship has established for all the countries. Results
from column three also show that in the case of Peru, Russia and Venezuela null hypothesis of [1, α1= -1] is
not rejected during period-1, period-2 and period-3, respectively where slope parameter is greater than unity
and significant at 1% level (***mentioned). N/A indicates that restriction cannot be applied in the absence of
a co-integrating vector.
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other for all the countries even for Russia where they were not found to co-move in pre-crisis
era.
After running the tests for unit root and co-integration I have identified the periods for
all the countries where I can use VECM to find that which market contributes heavily to the
price discovery process of sovereign credit risk. Summary of these periods is given in table
2.8. Column numbers 3, 4 and 5 report the cross (X) signs for pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis
periods, respectively where co-integration has reported for different countries and VECM can
be used. Clearly it can be seen that during period-1 (period-2) VECM cannot (can) be applied
on Russian CDS and BS series only. However, during post-crisis period VECM will be
applied to the pair of credit risk series for all the countries.
Results of the VECM applied on cross (X) marked periods (period 1, 2 and 3 in table
2.8) are given in table 2.9. These results show a total domination of CDS market in efficient
pricing of sovereign credit risk. Panel ‘A’ reports the result of pre-crisis period and show that
according to GG measure of price discovery CDS market contribution ranges from 37.17% to
99.59%. If Mexico is not considered then this contribution ranges within 70.77% and 99.59%
clearly suggesting the superiority of CDS market in impounding new information. This
domination continues even during the post-crisis period (see Panel ‘B’) where, excluding
Mexico and Venezuela, CDS market contribution ranges within 61.32% and 99.63%. For
Mexico I have found that default risk price is mainly discovered in bond market for both pre
and post crisis era. In the case of Venezuela, sign of second error correction co-efficient i.e.,
λ2 is wrong as it is expected to be positive rather negative if both series need to be converged.
However, λ2 is not statistically significant thus showing that bond series does not move and
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all adjustment will be done by CDS series to remove the discrepancy in order to maintain a
long-run relationship with bond spread.
Table 2.8: Periods where vector error correction model needs to be applied

VECM Applied to Sovereign CDS and Bond Spread Series
Country

Overall period Pre-crisis (period-1)

Crisis (period-2) Post-crisis (period-3)

Brazil

X

X

-

X

Colombia

X

X

-

X

Mexico

X

X

-

X

Panama

X

X

-

X

Peru

X

X

-

X

Russia

X

-

X

X

Turkey

X

X

-

X

Venezuela

-

X

-

X

Cross (X) signs show that where I have found co-integration relationship between two series. It can be notices
that Russian is unique as, unlike other countries, its pair of series is not co-integrated during pre-crisis period.
However, it is the only country for which I have found co-integration during the crisis period. I have applied
reduced form VECM on credit series for periods against which 'X' is mentioned for a given country.

This has led to an extreme finding of 0% contribution of CDS market for Venezuela
as CDS market is totally inefficient. During the crisis period only for Russia the pair of
default risk series are co-integrated and CDS market dominates the PDP by 62.36%.
Hasbrouck suggests even higher contribution of CDS market i.e. 81.22%. Panel ‘D’ of table
2.9 reports the mean and median contribution of CDS market in pre and post crisis periods.
Because of few extreme cases I would prefer to discuss the median contribution of CDS
series. According to GG (Hasbrouck) measure 72.16% (63.49%) contribution is done during
the pre-crisis period and 70.75% (62.20%) during the post-crisis period by the CDS market.
My findings for the overall, pre-crisis, post-crisis and crisis periods suggest that CDS
market is instrumental in efficient pricing of sovereign credit risk. For all the countries, on an
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Table 2.9: CDS & bond market contribution to PDP of credit risk in sub periods

Contribution of CDS and Bond Markets to Price Dicovery Process in Period1,2 and 3
Hasbrouck
λ1

t-Statistic

λ2

Panel A
Brazil

-0.010

-1.08

0.025

1.96

72.16%

0.39

0.88

63.49%

Colombia

-0.018

-1.56

0.048

2.98

72.67%

0.32

0.91

61.29%

Mexico

-0.025

-2.87

0.015

0.81

37.17%

0.05

0.39

21.87%

Panama

-0.011

-1.19

0.059

3.49

84.02%

0.57

0.93

75.09%

Peru

-0.009

-0.94

0.023

2.01

70.77%

0.38

0.84

61.13%

Turkey

-0.023

-1.51

0.058

3.26

72.01%

0.45

0.90

67.83%

Venezuela -0.001

-0.09

0.308

5.23

99.59%

0.96

1.00

98.21%

Panel B
Brazil

-0.006

-1.51

0.22

3.13

78.32%

0.54

0.87

70.77%

Colombia

0.000

-0.02

0.015

2.89

99.63%

0.89

1.00

94.32%

Mexico

-0.042

-1.96

0.009

0.78

17.24%

0.13

0.19

16.17%

Panama

-0.025

-1.71

0.043

2.93

63.17%

0.24

0.76

50.15%

Peru

-0.002

-0.62

0.017

3.22

89.65%

0.54

0.82

85.88%

Russia

-0.009

-1.47

0.014

2.13

61.32%

0.23

0.89

55.98%

Turkey

-0.010

-1.43

0.044

4.73

81.09%

0.41

0.96

68.42%

Venezuela -0.043

-3.99

-0.005

-1.31

0.00%

0.09

0.10

9.61%

Panel C
Russia

-0.76

0.012

3.03

62.36%

0.67

0.96

81.22%

-0.007

t-Statistic GG (CDS) Lower

Panel D
Mean for pre-crisis period
Median for pre-crisis period
Mean for post-crisis period
Median for post-crisis period

72.63%
72.16%
61.30%
70.75%

-

Upper Mid (CDS)

-

64.13%
63.49%
56.41%
62.20%

Panel A, B and C reports the results of contribution of CDS market to the price discovery process of
sovereign credit risk during pre-crisis, post-crisis and crisis periods, respectively. Two price discovery
measures are reported, GG(1995) is column seven and HAS-Mid(1995) in column 9. Where appropriate
restriction of [1,α1= -1] on co-integration vector is applied. Panel 'D' reports the mean and median
contribution of CDS market during pre and post crisis periods.
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average CDS contributes towards the PDP within the range of 60% to 75%. Mostly there is
one way interaction between two default series as bond market appears to follow CDS
market except in the case of Mexico. During the post-crisis another exception is Venezuela
where all the contribution is made by the bond market. During crisis both markets start
pricing sovereign default risk differently and no common trend persist between the pair of
credit risk series. This is quite intuitive as both markets appear to stop following same
fundamentals during the times of distress.
Thus, I have found total support for hypothesis H(1) for the whole period and for pre
and post crisis periods. H(1) is not supported during the crisis period as from 7 out of 8
countries I found no common stochastic trend between two credit risk series. Moreover, it is
reported that CDS market dominates the bond market during all the periods except during
crisis where VECM cannot be applied due to the absence of co-integration. On an average
CDS contributes to the credit risk PDP within the range of 60% to 75%, thus supporting
H2(a) and rejecting H2(b) & H2(c).
Possible explanation of CDS market’s domination
As a potential reason for the CDS market’s domination, I cite the difference in
liquidity between the two markets. This is intuitive in that the more liquid market should
have more investors impounding information in it and thus, contribute more towards the
price discovery of credit risk. To examine this theory, I calculate the mean ratio of the bond
to CDS bid-ask spread in each market and compute the correlation of this ratio with the GG
(CDS) and Hasbrouck (CDS) measures of price discovery for each period except during the
crisis. A higher ratio suggests that the CDS market is more liquid since the bond market
would have a higher bid-ask spread, which is a sign of relative illiquidity.
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As per the results reported in table 2.10, the correlation is close to +1 for all three
periods examined. Specifically, in Panel ‘A’, where the results for the overall period are
reported, the correlation is 0.86 between the market liquidity ratio and GG measure and 0.73
for the Hasbrouck measure. Thus, it suggests the CDS market is more likely to price
sovereign credit risk efficiently when the bond market is illiquid. Results are also similar for
the pre-crisis period (Panel B) and post-crisis period (Panel C), with the liquidity explanation
gaining even more credence during the post-crisis period as correlations are almost +1 (0.98
and 0.97).
Finally, table 2.11 reports the Wald test of Granger Causality for periods in which no
co-integration between the synthetic and cash markets is observed (please see table 2.8
again). Granger causality tests whether lagged values of one market predict current values of
the other, after controlling for the lags of the subject market. In Panel ‘A’, the results for
Venezuela for the aggregate time period are reflected in which a two-way interaction
between the markets is observed, suggesting the presence of a feedback loop (p-values in
parenthesis shows the null of no granger causality rejected at 1% level of significance). This
overall “average” result is not surprising in light of the findings in table 2.9 which document
that during the pre-crisis period, the CDS market contributed 99.59% to the PDP, which then
fell to 0% post-crisis. In addition, it underscores the importance of sub-sample analysis in
order to detect the existence of regime dependence. In Panel ‘B’, which reports the results for
Russia during the pre-crisis period, I conclude that only the bond market granger causes the
CDS market (null is rejected at 1% level of statistical significance) as there is no flow in the
other direction. Finally, Panel ‘C’ reports results for all countries for the aggregate time
period except Russia, which is excluded due to co-integration. As can be seen, CDS spreads
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Table 2.10: Correlations between ratio of bond to CDS bid-ask spread & PD measures

Correlation between ratio of bond to CDS bid-ask spreads and price discovery measures
Mean Ratio of
Mean CDS bid- Mean Bond bid- bond to CDS
ask spread
ask spread
bid ask spread GG (CDS) HAS(CDS)
a
b
c
d
e
Panel A
Brazil
0.04
0.14
3.66 74.60% 68.10%
Colombia
0.06
0.23
3.92 82.78% 75.73%
Mexico
0.09
0.19
2.15 21.65% 22.10%
Panama
0.04
0.15
3.73 89.08% 77.81%
Peru
0.07
0.22
3.17 73.86% 76.94%
Russia
0.07
0.19
2.63 62.13% 70.20%
Turkey
0.05
0.14
2.86 75.05% 71.25%
Corr(c,d)
Corr(c,e)
Panel B
Brazil
Colombia
Mexico
Panama
Peru
Turkey
Venezuela

0.86
0.73
0.03
0.05
0.07
0.03
0.06
0.07
0.05

0.09
0.14
0.17
0.11
0.16
0.18
0.18

3.06
2.98
2.47
3.84
2.73
2.66
3.61

Corr(c,d)
Corr(c,e)
Panel C
Brazil
Colombia
Mexico
Panama
Peru
Russia
Turkey
Venezuela
Corr(c,d)
Corr(c,e)

72.16%
72.67%
37.17%
84.02%
70.77%
72.01%
99.59%

63.49%
61.29%
21.87%
75.09%
61.13%
67.83%
98.21%

0.80
0.75
0.04
0.05
0.09
0.04
0.06
0.07
0.04
0.98

0.15
0.22
0.14
0.12
0.22
0.23
0.13
0.74

3.86
4.66
1.56
2.99
3.66
3.27
3.31
0.73

78.32%
99.63%
17.24%
63.17%
89.65%
61.32%
81.09%
0.00%

70.77%
94.32%
16.17%
50.15%
85.88%
55.98%
68.42%
9.61%

0.98
0.97

Panel A reports the bid-ask spreads of the two markets and the correlation between the mean ratio of
two spreads and price discovery measure for the whole period. These correlations are highlights in
panel A. The same items are reported in Panel B and C for pre-crisis and post-crisis periods,
respectively.
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have predictive power for bond spreads in the majority of countries, while in the case of
Mexico and Venezuela, two way causal flow is observed. However, interestingly for Peru
Table 2.11: Granger causality tests conducted in the first essay

Granger Casuality Tests
Null hypothesis
BS does not granger cause CDS CDS does not granger cause BS
Panel A
Venezuela

108.23 (0.00)

176.43 (0.00)

Panel B
Russia

37.65 (0.00)

0.03 (0.98)

Panel C
Brazil
Colombia
Mexico
Panama
Peru
Turkey
Venezuela

0.72 (0.70)
1.18 (0.55)
8.75 (0.01)
3.49 (0.18)
2.26 (0.13)
0.53 (0.77)
9.08 (0.01)

31.38 (0.00)
14.01 (0.00)
22.60 (0.00)
21.98 (0.00)
00.66 (0.42)
208.78 (0.00)
25.56 (0.00)

This table reports the Wald test of granger causality of two credit spreads during the periods
where I have not find co-integration between them. Here, null hypothesis states that lagged values
of both spreads do not predict eachothers' present values after controlling its own lags. Within the
parenthesis p-value is given. Panel A, B and C show the results for the overall period, pre-crisis
and crisis periods, respectively. Panel 'A' shows that during the overall period both CDS and BS
of Venezuela granger cause each other. M eaning, that for the overall period some or all the lagged
values of Venezuelan BS (CDS) predicts the current value of CDS (BS) after controlling for CDS
(BS) own lags. Thus, there is a feedback loop for Venezuela during the overall period. Panel 'B'
shows the result of Russian spreads during pre-crisis period and reports that only BS granger
causes CDS. Finally, Panel 'C' reports that during the crisis mostly CDS leads the BS for all the
countries with few exceptions (Peru with no feedback loop, and M exico and Venezuela with
feedback loop).

there is no causality documented in either direction, suggesting cross market efficiency.

2.6 Implications
These findings have major implications for financial stakeholders, as they highlight
the importance of the CDS market in pricing sovereign credit risk in emerging countries.
Specifically, this study documents that the contribution of the CDS market to the price
discovery process has increased over time and that investors in the sovereign bond market
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need to closely monitor the CDS market in order to make well-informed financial decisions.
Theoretically, profitable trading opportunities can arise by responding to newly revealed
information in the derivative market via the buying or selling in the cash market, depending
on the price signal sent. However, it is important to keep in mind that the relative liquidity of
these two markets plays a key role in the price discovery process. If for some reason liquidity
in the bond market increases then the CDS market could lose its advantage or the bond
market could conceivably become the price leader in setting credit risk prices.
The findings are also relevant for regulators, suggesting that the banning of
participants from actively participating in the CDS market when they don’t have a physical
position in the underlying bond is very detrimental to the overall financial system as it
reduces liquidity and thus introduces inefficiency in the price discovery process, at least in
the case of emerging countries. In line with this rationale, it appears that the 2011 ban on
“naked” CDS trading in Europe was not the right decision. If CDS markets are the price
leader, then it is imperative that everyone should be allowed to participate in them.
Finally, the finding during the financial crisis that both markets start pricing credit
risk differently is a reminder that investors should not blindly follow rules and that during
times of extreme distress, markets may not price in risk rationally45.

2.7 Conclusion
This essay studies the relative contributions of CDS and bond markets to the sovereign
credit risk price discovery process for eight emerging countries (Brazil, Colombia, Mexico,
Panama, Peru, Russia, Turkey and Venezuela) from 2006 to 2016. Although this topic has

45

Although it is important to note that Granger causality tests suggest that CDS spreads still lead bond spreads
in four out of seven countries during that time.
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been researched previously, findings in the area have been conflicting. In addition, due to the
ongoing euro crisis, most of the recent focus in the sovereign price discovery literature has
been on developed Eurozone countries. These factors coupled with the fact that credit
markets have undergone significant changes in the wake of the financial crisis make this
study on emerging countries timely. Moreover, recent events such as China’s financial
meltdown in 2015, the impact of reduced oil prices on the credit risk of oil exporting
emerging countries and the executive order issued by the Puerto Rican governor’s office to
declare a moratorium on a large portion of debt also re-emphasize the importance of
understanding the nature of emerging sovereign credit risk and which credit market prices it
more efficiently, the synthetic or the cash market.
As such, this essay contributes to the extant literature in four ways, namely by i)
settling the ongoing debate on market efficiency in the area of pricing sovereign default risk,
ii) analyzing data over a much longer period of time than done before, enabling a more
extended study of the long-run dynamic interaction between two markets, iii) testing for time
variance of the result by investigating pre-financial crisis, post-crisis and crisis period
subsamples, and iv) operationalizing two different price discovery measures for the first time
to check the robustness of the initial findings.
Country level analysis suggests that sovereign CDS generally dominate the price
discovery process during tranquil periods, with the bond market simply following its lead.
Specifically, the median CDS contribution is more than 70% towards the PDP of sovereign
credit risk. This finding is attributed to the greater relative liquidity of the synthetic market.
However, during the financial crisis, there is no common stochastic trend observed between
CDS and bond spreads, suggesting that during times of extreme distress in the financial
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system, the markets start to price credit risk differently and independently of one another.
Interestingly though, within the context of Granger causality robustness test, even during the
crisis period, the CDS market led the bond market for most of the countries. These results
have implications for emerging market investors and asset managers who engage in arbitrage
between the two markets as well as financial stakeholders who monitor sovereign credit
spreads to gauge the level of political and/or default risk in emerging market countries.
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3 ESSAY 2: IMPACT OF STATE FRAGILITY ON
SOVEREIGN CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP PRICING
3.1 Introduction
Research in the area of pricing determinants of sovereign credit default swaps has
primarily focused on country specific macroeconomic fundamentals and global financial
factors (Lee, Naranjo, & Sirmans, 2013). Surprisingly, little attention has been paid to
explore the relationship between the country specific socioeconomic factors and sovereign
CDS pricing. Deviating from the traditional approach of employing global and
macroeconomic variables, few studies turned to employ other types of variables to explain
derivative pricing. For example, a recent study by Hansen and Zegarra (2016) has established
a strong positive relationship between sovereign credit risk and country specific political risk
for 12 Latin American countries. Baldacci, Gupta, and Mati (2011) also report that lower
level of political risk results in tighter sovereign bond spreads. One important aspect in this
regard is the overall state fragility —a construct borrowed from foreign policy literature— as
more fragile states are highly likely to default on their debt obligations. Thus, directly raising
the cost of their borrowings as measured by the sCDS prices traded on their bonds. This
essay will contribute towards the existing literature by formally establishing a relationship
between state fragility and the sCDS premium.
In this context, this study is the first to examine how state fragility affects sCDS
pricing. There has been disagreement in the foreign policy literature about the true definition
of fragile states (for details kindly refer to Call (2008)). Concept of state fragility, its
definition and measurement have been described in detail in the book written by
Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray (2011). According to the authors fragile states are those
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states which are not able to improve their economic growth and/ or able to reduce the poverty
due to their ineffective policies and governance, and poor institutional performance. This
results in an inability to absorb the inflow of funds effectively —generated either through aid
or loan— and therefore may result in added premium required by the creditors as
compensation to bear additional risk. According to the “Fund for Peace” organization’s
annual report46 for the year 2014, fragile states are those states which are more inclined to
indulge in internal conflicts, thus resulting in mass violence due to fault lines emerged among
different identity groups based on religion, clans, class, caste, nationality etc. This situation,
obliviously, may push a country towards the brink of failure, thus resulting in higher cost of
borrowing.

3.2 Literature Review
Pricing of sCDS has been an important topic of research in finance. Usually there have
been two approaches adopted to find the determinants of sCDS prices. The first approach is
based on comparing the observed prices with the one suggested by structural model, while
the second is based on regression analysis where changes in the sCDS spread is regressed on
selected independent variables.
In the later approach, two groups of variables have been identified in the current
literature; one group is categorized as “global variables” and the other as “country-specific
variables” which may affect the countries’ credit risk and therefore, their sCDS prices. While
considering country specific variables, the main emphasis rests on macroeconomic
fundamentals which affect credit profile of a country.

46

http://library.fundforpeace.org/library/cfsir1423-fragilestatesindex2014-06d.pdf
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Many studies have concluded that global financial variables explain the spread more
often than country specific fundamentals. Based on the co-movement of sCDS prices of
different countries, the current knowledge proposes a common factor which affects sCDS in
the same fashion, as they jump together. This finding was confirmed, among others, by Pan
and Singleton (2008), Longstaff, Pan, Pedersen, and Singleton (2011), and Augustin and
Tédongap (2014). Using data on developed and emerging countries, Longstaff et al. (2011)
report that US equity, high-yield factor and fear factor embedded in VIX47 are significantly
related to sCDS spreads. Their work is built on the theoretical model developed by Pan and
Singleton (2008), who demonstrate that the credit risk of Korea, Mexico and Turkey is
explained by VIX and the spread between returns on U.S. BB-rated industrial corporate
bonds with 10-years maturity and U.S. treasury bills of 6-months maturity.
By decomposing the sCDS spread into systemic and country specific non-systemic
components, Ang and Longstaff (2013) suggest that the spread is more related to financial
markets thus providing support to the opinion that global variables are more likely to drive
sCDS prices. Augustin and Tédongap (2014) show the U.S. macroeconomic uncertainty and
U.S. growth consumption are strongly associated with the spread. This finding is robust to
the inclusion of CBOE volatility index (VIX), U.S. excess equity return and high-yield and
investment-grade bond spreads, among others. Dooley and Hutchison (2009) find that U.S.
financial and economic news had a strong impact on the CDS spreads in 14 emerging
countries during the financial crisis. Fender, Hayo, and Neuenkirch (2012) show global and
regional factors influence CDS spreads more than those related to country fundamentals. In

Ticker symbol for Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index which shows the market’s expectation
of volatility in next 30 days.
47
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short, aforementioned papers provide evidences that global variables drive sCDS prices more
than country specific factors.
In contrast a related strand of literature suggests that country specific variables are also
important in explaining the sovereign credit risk spread. Most studies have considered
macroeconomic variables, in an attempt to explain the pricing as they seem to be an intuitive
choice which can impact the sovereign entities’ ability to meet its obligation. While
exploring the sCDS pricing of 24 emerging markets, Remolona, Scatigna, and Wu (2008)
find the co-existence of both group of factors –global and country specific— in explaining
spread. Using spread data of Eurozone area, Caceres, Guzzo, and Segoviano Basurto (2010)
mention that during the recent financial crisis, global risk aversion led to increase in prices.
However, as the crisis abated in October 2009 country specific fiscal measures appeared as
important determinant of sCDS pricing. Aizenman, Hutchison, and Jinjarak (2013) link
fiscal space –measured by debt-to-tax and deficits-to-tax— to debt pricing and report an
increase of 100 basis points in the debt-to-tax ratio increases sCDS spread by 15 to 81 basis
points. In another study, conducted by Aizenman, Jinjarak, and Park (2016), inflation,
external debt and term-of-trade volatility appear to increase the spread, while trade openness
and fiscal balance decrease it. They also conclude regime shift among economic
fundamentals in explaining the spread over the study’s time period as importance of variables
varies over time during pre-crisis and post-crisis era. Using data from 123 developing
countries over the period of 1970-2012, Zeaiter (2015) finds that accumulated arrears on
interest payments and principal repayments on the debt serve as effective proxy of sovereign
default. He finds that in low-income countries political risk deeply impacts these
accumulated arrears. To remain in a safe zone; he suggests that indebted countries should

68
stabilize their exchange rate, prudently manage their debt, and increase transparency in
public institutions.
Other studies attempt to determine sovereign CDS spreads in unique way. Cosset and
Jeanneret (2015) developed a structural model based on effectiveness of raising the tax
revenues and used them effectively to price the sovereign risk. Their aim was to establish a
relation between government quality and likelihood of default. They empirically test the
model and confirm that efficient tax collection is negatively related to the likelihood of
default and, therefore, sCDS spreads. Using sCDS data for Mexico and Brazil, Carr and Wu
(2007) argue that spread co-vary with currency option implied volatility. Finally, Lee et al.
(2013) show that strong property and creditors’ rights are negatively related to CDS prices.

3.3 Hypothesis Development
In their book, Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray (2011) describe the concept of state
fragility, its definition and how it is measured. According to the authors fragile states are
states that cannot improve their economic growth or reduce poverty due to ineffective
policies, bad governance, and poor institutional performance. They cannot absorb the inflow
of funds —generated either through aid or loan— effectively as a result creditors charge
higher premium as compensation for additional risk. According to the “Fund for Peace”
annual report for the year 2014, fragile states are more inclined to engage in internal
conflicts, thus resulting in mass violence due to fault lines emerged between different identity
groups based on religion, clans, class, caste, or nationality. This situation may push a country
towards the brink of failure, thus resulting in higher borrowing cost and hence higher sCDS
spreads. According to another definition, the fragile state concept is related to the ability of a
government to ensure peace and establishment of institutions that serve the population under
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its jurisdiction. This concept is rediscovered in the context of “war on terror” as western
powers considered such states as a threat to their own sovereignty and to world peace (Call,
2008). Therefore, the fragile state concept is also linked with terrorism indicating that the
countries are not only subject to terrorist attacks themselves but can also be a breeding
ground of such attacks in other parts of the world. In a recent study, Procasky and Ujah
(2016) find that terrorism is associated with higher cost of debt for sovereign entities.
Based on above premise and the intuitive relationship between fragility/ instability of
the state and its ability to meet its debt obligations, I hypothesize the following:
H3: A country’s fragility or instability is positively related to the sovereign credit
default swap spreads traded on their sovereign bonds.

3.4 Data and Methodology
This study uses annual data for 66 countries from 2007 to 2015. My main variable of
interest is the “Fragile State Index” (FSI), which has been published regularly since 2006 by
Fund for Peace organization for at least 146 countries. This index is constructed based on 12
socio-economic and political-military indicators; where each ranges from 0 to 10 and are
added together to form the overall index (Fragile State Index Report-201448, page 10).
Components measure demographic pressures, refugees and IDPs, uneven economic
development, group grievance, human flight & brain drain, poverty & economic decline,
state legitimacy, public services, human right violations & rule of law, security apparatus,
factionalized elites and external intervention. The baseline panel regression is given as under:
Baseline regression
𝑥
ln(𝑠𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 ) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 ln(𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝛽2 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ln ( ) + 𝛽5 𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝑚 𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽6 ln(𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑡 ) + 𝛽7 ln(𝑣𝑖𝑥𝑡 ) + 𝛽8 ln(𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡 ) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
48
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Where:
𝐥𝐧(𝒔𝑪𝑫𝑺𝒊𝒕 )=Log of the annual mean of sovereign credit default swaps in basis-points traded
on the bond of 5-year maturity for the country ‘i’ in year ‘t’(dependent variable)
𝐥𝐧(𝑭𝑺𝑰𝒊𝒕 )=Log of fragile state index variable of the country ‘i’ in year ‘t’ which ranges

between 0 to 120 with 0 being least and 120 being most fragile state49(main variable of
interest)
𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒕 =Ratio of change in annual foreign reserves to total GDP of the country ‘i’ in year

‘t’(country-specific variable)
𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒊𝒕=Annual inflation (consumer prices) in percentage of the country ‘i’ in year

‘t’(country-specific variable)
𝑿

𝐥𝐧(𝒎)𝒊𝒕 =Log of the ratio of total annual exports to total imports for the country ‘i’ in year
‘t’(country-specific variable)
𝒈𝒅𝒑_𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒊𝒕 =Annual GDP growth rate of country ‘i’ in the year ‘t’ (country-specific

variable)
𝐥𝐧(𝒕𝒚𝒓𝒕 )=Log of the annual mean of US 10-year treasury rate in the year ‘t’ (global

variable)
𝐥𝐧(𝒗𝒊𝒙𝒕 )=Log of the annual mean of CBOE-VIX index in the year ‘t’ (global variable)
𝐥𝐧(𝒔𝒑𝒕 )=Log of the annual mean of S&P500 index in the year ‘t’ (global variable)

According to the hypothesis developed in this essay, I expect a statistically significant
positive correlation between sovereign CDS prices and state fragility. Hence, if a country is
perceived more risky and fragile then investors would demand higher interest rates on their

49

All values are non-zero for this variable in my dataset.
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sovereign bonds which in turn leads to higher CDS premiums to protect lenders’ investments
in the sovereign bonds of these unstable countries.
Data used in this essay comes from many different sources whose details are given in
table 3.1. This information along with the description and expected relationship between
dependent and independent variables are also presented in the table. The dependent variable
will be the log of the annual mean on the 5-year sovereign credit default swap spread in basis
points which is gathered from Bloomberg and Datastream. The main variable of interest is
the log of fragile state index, which is collected from the website of Fund for Peace
organization. Figure 3.1 shows the number of countries whose FSI improved or worsened
from 2006 to 2014. It is notable that there is significant variation in the number of countries
whose FSI have changed over this time period.
In line with the existing literature (Hilscher and Nosbusch (2010), Longstaff et al.
(2011), Aizenman et al. (2013), Topbas (2013), Aizenman et al. (2016), among others), three
global variables and four country specific macroeconomic control variables are included in
the analysis.
Control variables
In line with the price determination literature on sovereign CDS, I have controlled for
four country specific macroeconomic variables and three country invariant global variables.
The four macroeconomic variables are the ratio of the annual change in foreign reserves to
total GDP of the country “res”, the country’s annual inflation in percentage “infl”, the log of
the ratio of total annual exports to total imports of a country “ln(x/m)” and the annual GDP
growth rate of a country “gdp_growth”. Three global variables which do not vary for all the
countries for a given year include; log of the annual mean of 10-year US treasury rate
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Table 3.1: Description and sources of data used in second essay

Description and sources of data
Variable type and name
Description and data source
ln(sCDS)
Log of annual mean of 5-year soveregin CDS in basis points
ln(FSI)
Log of fragile state index on the scale of 0 to 120,
where 120 means high fragility (no zero value reported)
Control variables
Country specific variables
res
Ratio of change in annual foreign reserves to total GDP
infl
Annual inflation rate (consumer prices) in precentage
ln(x/m)
Log of the ratio of annual exports to total imports
gdp_growth Annual GDP growth rate in percentage
Global variables
ln(tyr)
Log of the annual mean of US 10-year treasury rate
ln(vix)
Log of the annual mean of CBOE volatility index
ln(sp)
Log of S&P-500 composite index value

Expected relationship

+ (hypothesized)
essay 2

Data source
Bloomberg and Datastream
fsi.fundforpeace.org

negative
positive
negative
negative

World development indicator
World development indicator
World development indicator
World development indicator

negative
positive
negative

Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis
Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis

Bloomberg

Note: ln(sCDS) is the dependent variable and log of the annual mean of sovereign credit default swaps, and ln(FSI) is the main independent variable in essay two and log of
fragile state index. Column three reports the expected relations between dependent variable and independent variables.
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Figure 3.1: Number of countries whose FSI improves or worsens from 2006 to 2014

Source: Fragile States Index Report 2014

“ln(tyr)”, log of the annual mean of COBE-VIX index “ln(vix)” and log of the annual mean
of S&P500 index “ln(sp)”.
Existing literature widely reports the negative association of “res” and sCDS prices as,
ceteris paribus, increases in foreign reserves suggests that a country will be more likely to
service its debt thus reducing its credit risk. Second country specific variable is the inflation
which positively impacts the protection prices as higher inflation rate demands higher yield
on the underlying bond and by definition yield is positively related to CDS spread. The third
control variable which affects sCDS prices negatively is the ratio of total annual exports of a
𝑥

country to its import (𝑚). Positive development in exports of a country relative to its imports
reduce the current account deficit and therefore, increases countries ability to meet its
obligations. The final macroeconomic variable is GDP growth which intuitively should have
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negative correlation with the dependent variable.
The three global variables are the log of annual mean 10-year US treasury rates, the
COBE-VIX index and the S&P500 index. An increase in 10-year US treasury rate negatively
impacts sovereign CDS of other countries. Moreover, an increase in the VIX, which is the
market’s expectation of volatility in next 30 days, is positively related to CDS price as more
fear among investors leads to higher demand on sovereign CDS. Finally, increases in the
S&P500 suggests that investors are more interested in high-yielding stock market investment
rather than investing in relatively less risky assets like bonds. Thus, the sovereign CDS
spread is negatively associated with the S&P500 index.

3.5 Results
Descriptive statistics of all variables are given in table 3.2. This is a panel study with
66 countries from 2007 to 2015. Thus, the maximum number of observations is 594 (66 x 9).
One noticeable thing from this table is the low number of observations for the dependent
variable ln(sCDS). One reason for having such a low number of sovereign CDS prices is the
lack of observations for many countries in 2007, as CDS trading on the sovereign bonds did
not start for many countries until 2008. The dependent variable and main variable of interest
are shown in bold letters in table 3.2.
Table 3.3 reports the correlation among all the variables present in the baseline
regression. The correlations of all the independent variables with the dependent variable are
shown in the second column and have expected signs. I expect a strong positive association
between the sCDS spread and my main variable of interest i.e., ln(FSI). In line with this
expectation table 3.3 reports a correlation of +0.52 between these two variables. Likewise,
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the correlations of all other control variables and the dependent variable are in accordance
with the expectations.
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of data used in second essay

Descriptive statistics
(1)
observations

(2)
mean

(3)
sd

(4)
min

(5)
max

Sovereign CDS (log)
Fragile state index (log)
US 10-year treasury rate (log)
VIX-CBOE volatility index (log)
S&P-500 composite index (log)
Change in foreign reserves/ total
res
GDP
infl
Inflation, consumer prices (%)
ln(x/m)
Ratio of export to import (log)
gdp_growth GDP growth rate (%)

541
594
594
594
594

4.881
3.901
1.040
3.011
7.253

1.136
0.443
0.274
0.298
0.237

1.837
2.821
0.593
2.652
6.854

9.609
4.713
1.535
3.487
7.631

586
587
577
594

0.0152
3.636
-0.0123
2.741

0.190
3.477
0.223
4.047

-1.178
-10.07
-0.711
-14.81

4.288
23.12
1.023
26.28

Number of countries

66

66

66

66

66

variables

labels

ln(sCDS)
ln(FSI)
ln(tyr)
ln(vix)
ln(sp)

Table 3.3: Correlation matrix of variables used in second essay

Correlation table
variables
ln(scds)

ln(fsi)

res

infl

ln(x/m)

gdp_growth

ln(tyr)

ln(vix)

ln(sp)

ln(scds)
ln(fsi)
res
infl
ln(x/m)
gdp_growth
ln(tyr)
ln(vix)
ln(sp)

1
-0.01
0.31
-0.27
0.26
0.01
0.03
-0.04

1
-0.05
0.03
0.1
-0.02
-0.04
0.07

1
-0.17
0.16
0.24
0.29
-0.21

1
0.09
-0.08
-0.05
0.03

1
0.14
-0.18
0.19

1
0.47
-0.44

1
-0.84

1

1
0.52
-0.02
0.32
-0.22
-0.11
-0.13
0.05
-0.1

Finally results from the baseline regressions using one way and two way fixed effects
are reported in table 3.4. Using the Hausman test, I formally test whether fixed effect or
random effect model gives consistent estimates. The null hypothesis is that the estimates of
both models are same which is rejected at 1% level, suggesting that estimates from the two

76
models are significantly different. In this situation, fixed effect model is prefered because it
gives consistent estimates while random effect model will provide inconsistent estimates.
Table 3.4: Regression results of fixed effect models from second essay

Impact of state fragility on sovereign credit default swaps
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
FE-Model
with main FE-Model FE-Model FE-Model
variable with global with all the with all the
variables
only
variables variables variables
Fragile state index (log)

2.760***
(4.67)

2.031***
(3.53)

1.596***
(2.87)
-0.044
(-0.35)
0.051***
(3.57)
-1.438***
(-4.23)
-0.070***
(-7.09)

-5.898**
(-2.56)

-1.474***
(-9.96)
0.396**
(2.27)
-0.675***
(-3.34)
2.108
(0.65)

1.778***
(3.16)
-0.067
(-0.52)
0.048***
(3.89)
-1.498***
(-4.28)
-0.062***
(-7.22)
-1.308***
(-8.97)
0.191
(1.09)
-0.514**
(-2.55)
2.358
(0.73)

541
0.09
66
YES
NO
0.09

541
0.22
66
YES
NO
0.11

521
0.44
66
YES
NO
0.38

521
0.49
66
NO
YES
0.46

Change in foreign reserves/ total GDP
Inflation, consumer prices (%)
Ratio of export to import (log)
GDP growth rate (%)
US 10-year treasury rate (log)
VIX-CBOE volatility index (log)
S&P-500 composite index (log)
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Number of countries
One way fixed effect
Two way fixed effect
Adj. R-Square
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Fixed Effect Models

Dependent variable is log of sovereign credit default swap in basis points

-2.735
(-1.26)
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However, I have also reported the regression results from pooled OLS and random effect
models in table 3.5.
Table 3.5: Regression results of OLS and random effect models from second essay

Impact of state fragility on sovereign credit default swap using pooled OLS and random effect models
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
OLS-Model
with main OLS-Model OLS-Model Random
variable with global with all the
effect
variables
only
variables variables
model
Fragile state index (log)

1.375***
(14.29)

1.359***
(14.63)

-0.490
(-1.29)

-1.384***
(-6.15)
0.322
(1.20)
-0.749**
(-2.50)
5.410*
(1.90)

1.292***
(12.63)
0.121
(0.63)
0.082***
(6.47)
-0.179
(-0.96)
-0.073***
(-6.60)
-1.262***
(-5.86)
-0.174
(-0.67)
-0.780***
(-2.69)
7.126**
(2.56)

1.509***
(8.24)
-0.051
(-0.39)
0.047***
(4.08)
-0.668**
(-2.56)
-0.065***
(-7.53)
-1.313***
(-8.84)
0.125
(0.70)
-0.578***
(-2.92)
4.076**
(1.97)

541
0.27
0.27

541
0.33
0.33

521
0.52
0.51

521

Change in foreign reserves/ total GDP
Inflation, consumer prices (%)
Ratio of export to import (log)
GDP growth rate (%)
US 10-year treasury rate (log)
VIX-CBOE volatility index (log)
S&P-500 composite index (log)
Constant

Observations
R-squared
Adj. R-Square
Number of countries
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Pooled OLS and RE Regressions

66

Dependent variable is log of sovereign credit default swap in basis points

There are four regression results reported in the table 3.4. The hypothesis of this
research that is state fragility positively impacts sovereign CDS prices is strongly supported
by all four regression models. Model (1) to (3) report the one way fixed effect model results
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using different specifications and model (4) reports the results of two way fixed effect
regression model.
By using fixed effect models I have controlled for the possible endogeniety problem
due to time and country invariant omitted variables. In all these regression models, my
dependent variable is the log of annual mean of sovereign CDS spreads of different
countries. Therefore, after controlling for other variables, results from models (1) to (4)
reports that a 1% increase in state fragility causes sovereign CDS to increase by 2.760%,
2.031%, 1.778% and 1.596%, respectively. Model (1) includes only main variable of interest
as an explanatory variable; model (2) further adds global variables to the model (1) and
model (3) includes all the variables to explain the variation in sovereign CDS prices. In
model (2), co-efficients of all global variables are statistically significant with expected signs.
Co-effiecients on VIX index indicates that a 1% increase in the index value leads to a
0.396% increase in sCDS prices. Moreover, a 1% increase in US 10-year treasury rate and
S&P500 index result in the reduction of sCDS premium by 1.474% and 0.675%,
respectively. For model (3), which includes all the variables, results of global variables
almost stay the same except for the VIX co-efficient as it does not remain significant even at
10% level.
In model (3), co-efficients on all the country specific macro-economic variables also
have expected signs. The only exception, in terms of statistical significance, is the coefficient on the ratio of change in annual reserves to total GDP as it does not exhibit
statistical significance. Model (3) reports that a 1% point increase in the inflation results in
4.92%50 increase in sCDS spread51. Likewise, a 1% point increase in the GDP growth rate

50
51

[100*(𝑒𝑥𝑝 (0.048) − 1)]
Here independent variable in not in the log form. Therefore, log-level interpretation is required.
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will result in a 6.01%52 reduction in protection premium. Finally, a 1% increase in the ratio
of total annual exports to imports suggests the reduction in protection prices by 1.50%.
The last model reported in table 3.4 shows the results of a two-way fixed effect in
which time dummies are included. Global variables, which are country invariant are dropped
as they do not vary across countries for a given year. In model (4), the co-efficients on
country specific variables remain similar to those reported in model (3) with the same level
of statistical significance. Indeed, the adjusted R-square for model (4) has improved by 8%
compared to that of model (3), suggesting the presence of some individual-specific invariant
omitted variables. Thus in terms of reliability, it appears that results from model (4) should
be given more weight. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, from model (4) it can be concluded
that on average, a 1% increase in state fragility causes sovereign CDS premium to increases
by 1.60%. Therefore, author finds significant support for the hypothesis of this study using
the fixed effect analysis reported in table 3.4.
Table 3.5 reports the results of pooled OLS and random effect regression models with
different specification. Model (1) only includes the main variable of interest and model (2)
includes global variables in addition to the main independent variable. Finally, models (3)
and (4) include all the control variables with the latter one reporting results from random
effect model. The co-efficient on the main variable i.e., log of fragile state index in all
models is positive and statistically significant thus, overwhelmingly supports the research
hypothesis. According to the random-effect model a 1% increase in state fragility increases
the sCDS prices by 1.51%. This finding is very close to what two way fixed effect model has
reported i.e., 1.59% increase in protection prices in response to 1% increase in state fragility.

52

[100*(𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−0.062) − 1)]
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Therefore, I can conclude that given a 1% increase in state fragility, on average, credit
derivative price increases, in basis points, by more than 1.5% for a country.

3.6 Implications
This study has formally established a link between state fragility and prices of
sovereign credit default swaps. The findings of this study suggest that state fragility has a
significant impact on sCDS premium and hence, the borrowing cost of a sovereign entity.
Therefore, apart from global financial factors and country specific macroeconomic variables,
this study has identified socioeconomic, political and military factors; incorporated in state
fragility measure as key drivers of credit derivative prices.
For policy makers, this finding has some serious implications. To reduce the borrowing
cost of a country, policy makers need to focus on individual components of the fragile state
index. The six factors listed under the social and economic indicators in fragile state index
are demographic pressures, refuges and internally displaced individuals, uneven economic
development, group grievance, human flight & brain drain and finally, poverty & economic
decline. Furthermore, six political and military indicators within this index are state
legitimacy, public service, human rights & rule of law, security apparatus, factionalized
elites, and external intervention.
Though many of these indicators indeed are interrelated, government can prioritize
them based on a certain criterion e.g., relevant ease in improving an individual factor to have
an immediate positive impact on the borrowing cost. Therefore, while attempting to reduce
the cost of borrowing for their country, in addition to economic development policy makers
should need to focus on socioeconomic factors as well. For example, under the component of
group grievance issues related to ethnic, communal, sectarian and religious violence are
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listed. For a country with miserable track record of group grievance, policy analysts should
focus more on tackling violence related issues rather than window dressing the
macroeconomic indicators in order to achieve sustainable economic growth and to reduce
borrowing cost for their country.

3.7 Conclusion
Unlike the existing literature, this study focuses on establishing a relationship between
non-traditional factor and sovereign credit default swap prices. Most studies in the area have
considered global financial and country specific macroeconomic variables as key
determinants of sCDS premium. This study reports that apart from these factors another
socioeconomic construct –borrowed from foreign policy literature— called state fragility has
significant impact on sovereign credit derivative prices. State fragility is defined in different
ways in the foreign policy literature. However, the most modern definition in the context of
the war on terror is that a country is a fragile state if it poses a threat to its own internal peace
and to world peace. Fragile states find it more difficult to meet their debt obligations thus,
level of state fragility is positively associate with sCDS as latter one is the pure measure of
sovereign credit risk. State fragility is operationalized by the Fund for Peace organization
through their fragile state index (FSI). Using the data from 66 countries over the period of
2007 to 2015, this study unveils a significant positive relationship between state fragility and
derivative prices. Thus, I found significant support for the hypothesis developed in this study
across different regression models and specifications. Moreover, signs on all the control
variables are found as expected. Using a two way fixed effect model, this research concludes
that a 1% increase in state fragility causes the sovereign credit default prices to increase, on
average, by 1.60% for a country.

82

4 ESSAY 3: IMPACT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL ON
SOVEREIGN CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP PRICING
4.1 Introduction
In explaining the premium53, the literature on sovereign credit default swap (sCDS)
pricing mainly focuses on global factors and country specific macroeconomic variables.
Little attention has been paid to socioeconomic constructs which may affect a country’s
credit risk and hence, its sovereign credit default swap premium. One related socioeconomic
concept that may impact sCDS price is social capital whose advantages on country’s
financial and economic development, among other matters, have been thoroughly established
in political economy, management and accounting literature (Oyotode & Raja, 2015).
According to Fukuyama (2001), social capital represents the “instantiated informal norms”
that allows collaboration among different parties. Countries with high social capital have
high levels of generalized trust. In such societies people try to abstain from devious
behaviors to avoid internal and external guilt as society collectively punishes people who
behave opportunistically.
In a recent study, Oyotode and Raja (2015) find high social capital is linked with
efficient debt enforcement because interest rates, the duration and cost of bankruptcy process
are lower in countries with high social capital. Moreover firms are more likely to kept going
concern in high social capital states. Their results are robust to controlling for countries’
income, legal origin and other related debt enforcement characteristics.

53

Price of the sovereign credit default swaps
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In view of aforementioned discussion, if high social capital is positively related to
efficient debt enforcement, because individuals are deeply concerned about loss of in-trust
group and society’s punishment, then, intuitively, their governments might be more likely to
fulfill their international debt obligations to avoid global isolation, tougher sanctions and bad
publicity. This would, most likely, lead their governments to adopt policies to ensure
solvency and reduced credit risk. Hence, it results in lower sCDS premium on their sovereign
bonds.
In this backdrop, this essay contributes to the extant literature on sCDS pricing by
linking social capital to sCDS spreads.

4.2 Literature Review
The existing literature on sCDS pricing focuses on global financial variables and
country specific macroeconomic variables as determinants of sCDS premium. Pan and
Singleton (2008), Dooley and Hutchison (2009), Longstaff et al. (2011), Fender et al. (2012),
Ang and Longstaff (2013) and Augustin and Tédongap (2014), among others, find global
variables predict sCDS prices. In addition to global variables, Remolona et al. (2008),
Caceres et al. (2010), Aizenman et al. (2013), Aizenman et al. (2016) and Zeaiter (2015)
report that the sCDS spread is also explained by macroeconomic variables. Not much
attention is given to socioeconomic variables as determinants of the protection prices54. One
such socioeconomic construct which can affect a country’s sCDS spread is social capital
whose positive impact on the country’s financial and economic development has been widely
reported in the political economy and accounting literature.

54

Another term used for CDS prices
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According to Fukuyama (1999) informal culture that facilitates the collaboration
between the members of civil society is called social capital. Owing to higher level of mutual
trust and informal network, people have greater incentive to cooperate with each other in
countries with high social capital (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2004). Countries with high
social capital have greater “generalized trust”. Because of the general understanding that
other party to the transaction will keep its part of the bargain, individuals are more motivated
to keep their promises in countries with high social capital.
In high social capital countries, the overall level of trust increases the efficiency of
countries institutions by limiting the use of “formal law and organization” (Fukuyama, 1999).
In fact, individuals are able to collaborate through informal networks, reducing contracts’
counterparty risk. A higher level of trust reduces the tendency for one party to profit at the
expense of the other.
Research in political economy, accounting and management have thoroughly examined
and established the advantages of social capital. Studies show that countries with high social
capital have fewer avenues for devious conduct because opportunistic behaviors are punished
by a loss of in-group trust. Thus, corruption, crime, monitoring costs, and dishonesty are
lower in these countries (Guiso et al., 2004; Jha & Chen, 2014).
Social capital is therefore associated with both economic and financial development
(Knack & Keefer, 1997). In countries with low quality education and law enforcement,
“generalized trust” facilitates financial development. There is also a positive association
between “generalized trust” and quality of law enforcement (Putnam, 1993). Absence of
“generalized trust” leads to low quality of law enforcement, which contributes to financial
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and economic backwardness. Thus, countries with a high level of “generalized trust”
experience better quality of law enforcement, financial and economic development.
Social capital as measured by norms and informal networks foster compliance with
country’s laws and regulations. Stronger social norms and networks boost individuals’
commitment (P. S. Adler & Kwon, 2002). Internal and external penalties i.e. guilt and shame
linked with norms and networks increase the benefits of cooperation. In fact, people are more
likely to cooperate to avoid punishment from society. Thus, social norms and networks
reduce the costs of enforcing and monitoring contracts. Therefore, countries with high social
norms and networks will also experience better quality of law enforcement, financial and
economic development. In sum, social capital is a set of the trust, norms and networks that
foster better quality of law enforcement, financial and economic development.
This study proposes that apart from traditional global and country specific macroeconomic variables; country specific socioeconomic factors such as social capital can
significantly impact the prices of sovereign credit default swaps as it directly affects the
credit profile of the country.

4.3 Hypothesis Development
The literature on sovereign credit risk has linked financial and economic development
with lower default risk and therefore tighter sCDS spreads (Fontana & Scheicher, 2010;
Georgievska, Georgievska, Stojanovic, & Todorovic, 2008; Mellios & Paget-Blanc, 2006;
Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009; Sutton & Catão, 2002). As mentioned above, social capital is
strongly positively associated with economic development (Knack & Keefer, 1997). This
means that social capital might lower sovereign CDS premium through positively affecting
economic and financial development in a country. Therefore following can be hypothesized:
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H4: Social capital is associated with lower sovereign credit default swap spreads
Because democratic (authoritarian) and developed countries have stable (fragile)
economies, institutions and governance, therefore I hypothesize the following:
H5 (a): Sovereign CDS spread is lower for the countries with full democracies vs. those
which have hybrid or authoritarian governing regimes
H5 (b): Sovereign CDS spread is lower for the developed countries

4.4 Data and Methodology
This essay use cross sectional data for the year 2015 for 52 countries. The dependent
variable is the log of annual mean of 5-year sovereign CDS in basis points, the main
independent variable is social capital “SC”. Following Knack and Keefer (1997) I have used
level of trust in the society to proxy for social capital. This concept is operationalized by
Oyotode and Raja (2015) using data from World Value Survey (WVS). This survey has
conducted in six waves starting from 1981 to 2014 and data from almost 100 countries has
been gathered. Therefore this data is not collected through a single big survey but in episodes
which they call a wave. Here, it is assumed that beliefs and values do not change rapidly in a
society, hence social capital of a country surveyed in wave #1(1981-1984) would likely be
the same even in 2015 (please see figure 4.1). Though two graphs in the figure represent two
different waves, their similar coloring suggests the same level of social capital for a given
country across different time periods.
In the World Value Survey (WVS), the question used to measure the level of trust of
people in their fellow citizens and therefore, the social capital is “Generally speaking, would
you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with
people?” The proxy for social capital is the percentage of people in each country who
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replied, “Most people can be trusted”. The higher the percentage of people who trust their
countrymen, the higher is social capital in that country.
Data used in this essay comes from many different sources whose details are given in
the table 4.1 along with the description and expected relationship between dependent and
independent variables.
Figure 4.1: Social capital around the world for wave 1999-2004 and wave 2005-2009

Source: Oyotode and Raja (2015)

Control variables
Control variables are carefully selected from the existing literature55. These variables
include four country specific macroeconomic variables. I have also added the log of fragile
state index as this has been shown to increase sCDS prices in the second essay of this

55

Exact references given in the second essay
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Table 4.1: Description and sources of data used in third essay

Description and sources of data
Variable type and name
Description and data source
ln(sCDS)
Log of 5 years soveregin credit default swap in basis points
sc
Percentage of people mention that they can trust others
in a country
Control variables
Country specific variables
ln(FSI)
Log of fragile state index on the scale of 0 to 120,
where 120 means high fragility (no zero value reported)
res
Ratio of change in annual foreign reserves to total GDP
infl
Annual inflation rate (consumer prices) in precentage
ln(x/m)
Log of the ratio of annual exports to total imports
gdp_growth Annual GDP growth rate in percentage

Expected Ralationship

- (hypothesized)

Data Source
Bloomberg and Datastream
www.worldvaluessurvey.org

positive

fsi.fundforpeace.org

negative
positive
negative
negative

World development indicator
World development indicator
World development indicator
World development indicator

Note: ln(sCDS) is the dependent variable and log of the annual mean of sovereign credit default swaps. Social capital (sc) is the main independent variable in essay three and measured in term
of percentage. It suggests that how many percent of people involved in the survey for a given country trust their country men. Column three reports the expected relations between
dependent variable and other independent variables.
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dissertation. The first macroeconomic variable is the ratio of change in annual foreign
reserves to total GDP of a country (res). Previous studies largely report the negative
association between foreign reserves and sCDS prices as; an increase in foreign reserves
makes it easier to pay its debt and thus reduce sovereign credit risk. The second country
specific variable is the inflation rate “infl”, which increases the protection prices as higher
inflation results in higher yield on the underlying bond and by definition yield is positively
related to CDS premium. The third control variable is the ratio of annual total exports of a
𝑥

country to its imports (𝑚). Increase in total exports relative to a country’s imports will reduce
current account deficit and therefore, increases a country’s ability to service its debt. The last
macroeconomic variable is GDP growth (gdp_growth) which should have a negative
relationship with the dependent variable. Credit rating of the countries with sound economic
growth is usually high as lenders consider them less risky. Finally as proposed in the second
essay, fragile state index (FSI) is a construct borrowed from foreign policy literature which is
hypothesized to increase sCDS prices. Seller will demand high sCDS price for a country
which is perceived to be more fragile and risky.
Baseline regression
The final regression question is therefore:
𝑥
ln(𝑠𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖 ) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1 𝑆𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2 ln(𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖 ) + 𝛽3 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽5 ln ( ) + 𝛽6 𝑔𝑑𝑝_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
𝑚 𝑖

Where:
𝐥𝐧(𝒔𝑪𝑫𝑺𝒊 )=Log of the mean of observed daily values for sovereign credit default swaps in
basis-points traded on sovereign bond having 5-years to maturity for country ‘i’ (dependent
variable)
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𝑺𝑪𝒊 =Proxy for social capital, measured as % of people of country ‘i’ showing trust in their
countrymen (main variable of interest)
𝐥𝐧(𝑭𝑺𝑰𝒊 )=Log of the fragile state index variable of country ‘i’ which ranges between 0 to 120

with 0 being least and 120 being most fragile state56
𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒊 =Ratio of change in annual foreign reserves to total GDP of country ‘i’
𝒊𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒊=Inflation (consumer prices) in percentage of country ‘i’
𝑿

𝐥𝐧(𝒎)𝒊=Log of the ratio of total exports to imports for country ‘i’, and
𝒈𝒅𝒑_𝒈𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒊=GDP growth rate of country ‘i’.

4.5 Results
After merging all the data on above mentioned variables I am left with 52 countries
for the year 2015. Descriptive statistics of variables are given in table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of data used in third essay
Descriptive Statistics
VARIABLES
Sovereign CDS (log)
Social capital (%)
Fragile state index (log)
Change in foreign reserves/ total GDP
Inflation, consumer prices (%)
Ratio of export to import (log)
GDP growth rate (%)

(1)
Obs

(2)
mean

(3)
sd

(4)
min

(5)
max

52
52
52
52
52
52
52

4.865
27.29
3.961
0.0105
4.520
0.0199
3.703

0.698
15.05
0.418
0.0315
2.912
0.259
2.890

3.120
4.350
2.981
-0.0855
-0.360
0.551
-1.917

5.999
69.25
4.652
0.105
18.68
1.023
13.38

Results of baseline regressions
Results of the baseline regression is given in table 4.3. Model (1) provides the
regression results when dependent variable i.e. log of sovereign CDS is regressed only on the
social capital variable. In line with the expectation, co-efficient on the social capital is
negative (-0.024) and statistically significant at the 1% level. This suggest that sellers charge

56

All values are non-zero for this variable.

91
low sCDS premiums in country where social capital is higher. A one percentage point
increase in the social capital (say, from 4% to 5% or 30% to 31% etc.) of a country causes
reduction in sCDS premium by 2.4%57. I re-ran the regression including all the control
variables and its results are given under model (2) of table 4.3. Again significantly negative
association is reported between the main variable and the dependent variable.
Table 4.3: Results from baseline regression of third essay

Effect of social capital on sovereign credit default swaps
(1)
(2)
OLS-Model
with main
OLS-Model
variable
with all
VARIABLES
only
variables
Sovereign CDS (log)-Dependent Variable
Social capital (%)

-0.024***
(-4.39)

Fragile state index (log)
Change in foreign reserves/ total GDP
Inflation, consumer prices (%)
Ratio of export to import (log)
GDP growth rate (%)
Constant

5.532***
(31.91)

-0.012**
(-2.19)
0.957***
(4.62)
-2.557
(-1.29)
0.074***
(2.82)
0.210
(0.70)
-0.076***
(-2.97)
1.379
(1.59)

Observations
52
52
R-squared
0.28
0.67
Adj. R-Square
0.26
0.62
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Cross-sectional OLS Regressions
Dependent variable is log of sovereign credit default swap in basis points

Results suggest that after controlling for the county specific macroeconomic and
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[100*(𝑒𝑥𝑝 −0.024 − 1)]
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socioeconomic variables, a one percentage point increase in the social capital reduces the
sCDS prices by 1.2%58.
In table 4.3, signs on all the control variables are as expected and listed in table 4.1
𝑥

with the exception of the log of the ratio of total annual exports to imports [ln(𝑚)]. However,
the ratio co-efficient is not significant at a 10% level. T-statistics for other variables suggest
the co-efficient on fragile state index, inflation and GDP growth rate are statistically
significant at the 1% level. Although ratio of the change in annual foreign reserves to total
GDP has the expected sign, its t-statistics is very low (-1.29). The results suggest that a one
percent increase (NOT percentage point increase) in the fragile state index leads to an
increase of sCDS prices by 1.0%. Moreover, a one percentage point increase in the inflation
rate increases the derivative price by 7.1%59 and a one percentage point increase in the GDP
growth rate decreases the protection prices by 7.3%60. Because the adjusted R-Square is 0.62,
this suggests that almost 62% of the cross-sectional variation in the dependent variable can
be explained by the main variable and set of five country specific control variables. In order
to ensure the correct specification of the cross-sectional model in this study I have conducted
a Jarque-Bera Test (JBT) of normality on the residuals of the regression equation. The null
hypothesis of JBT is that residuals are normally distributed. The p-value is 0.47, meaning the
null hypothesis is not rejected, implying the residual is normally distributed. Therefore,
hypothesis H4 is strongly supported by the empirical analysis.
Analysis based on the type of governing regime and development level in a country
Recognizing the idiosyncratic characteristics of different countries I further
conducted the analysis based on the fact that 1) what type of regime governs the country and
[100*(𝑒𝑥𝑝 −0.012 − 1)]
[100*(𝑒𝑥𝑝0.074 − 1)]
60
[100*(𝑒𝑥𝑝 −0.076 − 1)]
58
59
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2) whether the country is a developed or developing country. In order to determine the
governing regime I followed the categorization proposed by democracy index formulated by
Economist Intelligence Unit of the Economist Group. They categorize the governance
structure in a country in the following ways:


Full democracies



Flawed democracies



Hybrid regimes, and



Authoritarian regimes
For the purpose of this study I have created two dummy variables only for full

democratic (d_democracy) countries and countries ruled by authoritarian regimes
(d_auth_regime). 14 out of 52 countries analyzed in my sample are identified as full
democracies and 7 out of 52 are classified as authoritarian regimes. The remaining 31
countries are either flawed democracies or hybrid regimes. For the latter categories I have not
created dummy variables as I only intended to investigate how the relationship between
social capital and sCDS prices differs for, either, true democratic countries and authoritarian
regimes. That is, true democracies vs. (authoritarian regimes + flawed democracies + hybrid
regimes) and authoritarian regimes vs. (true democracies + flawed democracies + hybrid
regimes).
Second, I have classified all 52 countries either developed or developing countries as
classified by International Monetary Fund (IMF). 19 countries are marked as developed and
the other 33 as developing countries. Only one dummy variable is created for developed
countries (d_developed). Therefore, the co-efficient on dummy variable of developed
countries will report that how the relationship between social capital and protection prices
differs from that of developing countries. I would expect that CDS premium will be lower in
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democratic and developed countries. Also it should be higher for the countries governed
under authoritarian regimes. This is because fully democratic (authoritarian) and developed
countries have stable (fragile) economies, institutions and governance.
Results are given in table 4.4. Model (1), (2) and (3) include dummy variables for
democratic, authoritarian and developed countries, respectively.
Table 4.4: Impact of social capital on sovereign CDS in different regimes

Effect of social capital on sCDS prices in democratic, authoritarian and developed countries
(1)
(2)
(3)
Sovereign
Sovereign
Sovereign
variables
CDS (log)
CDS (log)
CDS (log)
Social capital (%)
Fragile state index (log)
Change in foreign reserves/ total GDP
Inflation, consumer prices (%)
Ratio of export to import (log)
GDP growth rate (%)
One if country has democracy (dummy)

-0.011*
(-1.96)
0.852***
(3.59)
-2.493
(-1.25)
0.078***
(2.91)
0.183
(0.61)
-0.081***
(-3.09)
-0.177**
(-1.97)

-0.013**
(-2.19)
0.926***
(4.08)
-2.159
(-0.94)
0.074***
(2.74)
0.182
(0.59)
-0.077***
(-2.96)

0.083
(0.35)

One if country has authoritarian regime (dummy)

1.509
(1.59)

-0.017*
(-1.70)
1.324
(1.18)

52
0.67
NO
YES
NO
0.61

52
0.67
NO
NO
YES
0.61

One if country is a developed country (dummy)
Constant

-0.012**
(-2.13)
0.970***
(3.65)
-2.551
(-1.27)
0.075***
(2.76)
0.216
(0.69)
-0.076***
(-2.92)

1.817*
(1.83)

Observations
52
R-squared
0.67
Democracy dummy
YES
Authoritarian regime dummy
NO
Developed country dummy
NO
Adj. R-Square
0.62
t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Cross-sectional OLS Regression
Dependent variable is log of sovereign credit default swap in basis points
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Signs on all the dummy variables are in line with my expectation. In model (1) the coefficient on the dummy variable for democratic countries is statistically significant,
suggesting that on average CDS spread is 16.2%61 lower for the countries having democratic
regime compared to those which lack true democracy. Model (2) reports insignificant coefficient on dummy variable of authoritarian regime with positive sign which I have earlier
anticipated. Lack of enough observations seems to be a plausible reason why significance has
not been established in this case. Finally model (3) reports the co-efficient on the dummy
variable of developed countries. Its co-efficient is statistically significant at the 10% level,
suggesting that CDS prices traded on developed countries’ bonds are 1.7% lower than those
traded on developing entities debt. All other variables i.e., main variable (social capital %)
and control variables in table 4.4 have similar signs and levels of statistical significance as
reported in table 4.3. Therefore, I found support for both H5(a) and H5(b).

4.6 Conclusion
Extant literature widely reports global financial and country specific macroeconomic
variables are key determinants of sovereign credit default spreads. Therefore, not much
attention has been given to country specific socioeconomic variables like social capital as
possible predictors of sovereign CDS premiums. In an attempt to fill this gap in the current
literature, this study formally investigate the relationship between social capital and
sovereign credit default swap spread. Social capital represents the “instantiated informal
norms” that allows collaboration among different parties. Countries with high social capital
have high level of generalized trust. In such societies people try to abstain from devious
behaviors to avoid internal and external guilt as society collectively punishes people with an

61

[100*(𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−0.177) − 1)]
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intent of opportunistic behaviors. Existing literature in political economy, management and
accounting have found positive impact of social capital on the financial and economic
development. On the other hand, in the sovereign CDS pricing literature a negative
association between CDS spread and economic growth of sovereign entity is firmly
established. Therefore, a negative impact of social capital on CDS premium is hypothesized
in this study.
This research finds strong support for the hypothesis and reports that social capital
impacts CDS prices after controlling for country specific macroeconomic variables. A one
percentage point increase in social capital of a country, ceteris paribus, causes the reduction
in its CDS spread by 1.19% after controlling for country specific macroeconomic variables.
Moreover, I found that CDS spread is 16.22% lower for countries which have full
democracies compared to one which does not have a true form of democracy in the year
2015. Finally, for developed countries protection prices are lower by 1.69% compared to that
of developing sovereign entities.
This study highlights the importance of socioeconomic variable which should not be
over looked by the stakeholders in determining the protection prices. Therefore, in addition
to global and macroeconomic variables due consideration should be given to related country
specific socioeconomic variables while assessing the country’s default risk and hence, in
measuring the sovereign credit default swap prices.
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5 CONCLUSIONS
The first essay studies the relative contributions of CDS and bond markets to the
sovereign credit risk price discovery process for eight emerging countries (Brazil, Colombia,
Mexico, Panama, Peru, Russia, Turkey and Venezuela) from 2006 to 2016. Although this
topic had been researched previously, findings in the area were conflicting. In addition, due
to the ongoing euro crisis, most of the recent focus in the sovereign price discovery literature
has been on developed Eurozone countries. These factors coupled with the fact that credit
markets have undergone significant changes in the wake of the financial crisis make this
study on emerging countries timely. Moreover, recent events such as China’s financial
meltdown in 2015, the impact of reduced oil prices on the credit risk of oil exporting
emerging countries and the executive order issued by the Puerto Rican governor’s office to
declare a moratorium on a large portion of debt also re-emphasize the importance of
understanding the nature of emerging sovereign credit risk and which credit market prices it
more efficiently, the synthetic or the cash market.
As such, the first essay contributes to the extant literature in four ways, namely by i)
settling the ongoing debate on market efficiency in the area of pricing sovereign default risk,
ii) analyzing data over a much longer period of time than done before, enabling a more
extended study of the long-run dynamic interaction between two markets, iii) testing for time
variance of the result by investigating pre-financial crisis, post-crisis and crisis period
subsamples, and iv) operationalizing two different price discovery measures for the first time
to check the robustness of the initial findings.
Country level analysis suggests that sovereign CDS generally dominates the price
discovery process during tranquil periods, with the bond market simply following its lead.
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Specifically, the median CDS contribution is more than 70% towards the price discovery
process of sovereign credit risk. This finding is attributed to the greater relative liquidity of
the synthetic market. However, during the financial crisis, there is no common stochastic
trend observed between CDS and bond spreads, suggesting that during times of extreme
distress in the financial system, the markets start to price credit risk differently and
independently of one another. Interestingly though, within the context of Granger causality
robustness test, even during the crisis period, the CDS market led the bond market for most
of the countries. These results have implications for emerging market investors and asset
managers who engage in arbitrage between the two markets as well as financial stakeholders
who monitor sovereign credit spreads to gauge the level of political and/or default risk in
emerging markets.
The second essay focuses on establishing relationship between non-traditional factor
and sovereign credit default swap prices. Most studies in the area have considered global
financial and country specific macroeconomic variables as key determinants of sovereign
CDS premium. The second essay reports that apart from these factors another socioeconomic
construct –borrowed from foreign policy literature— called state fragility has significant
impact on sovereign CDS pricing. State fragility is defined in different ways in the foreign
policy literature. However, the most modern definition in the context of war on terror is that a
country is fragile state if it poses threat to its own internal and world peace. Fragile states
find it more difficult to meet their debt obligations thus, level of state fragility is positively
associate with sovereign CDS spreads as latter one is the pure measure of sovereign credit
risk. State fragility is operationalized by the Fund for Peace organization through their fragile
state index (FSI). Using the data from 66 countries over the period from 2007 to 2015, the
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second essay unveils significant positive relationship between state fragility and derivative
prices. Thus, I unanimously found support for the developed hypothesis across different
types of regression models with varying specifications. Moreover, signs on all control
variables are found as expected. Using two way fixed effect model, this research concludes
that a 1% increase in state fragility causes the sovereign credit default prices to increase, on
average, by 1.596% for a country.
Finally, the third essay is closely related to the second essay as it also attempts to
establish the relationship between another socioeconomic construct, namely social capital,
and sovereign CDS pricing. Social capital represents the “instantiated informal norms” that
allows collaboration among different parties. Countries with high social capital have a high
level of generalized trust. In such societies people try to abstain from devious behaviors to
avoid internal and external guilt as society collectively punishes people with an intent of
opportunistic behaviors. Existing literature in political economy, management and
accounting have reported positive impact of social capital on the financial and economic
growth of a country. On the other hand, in the sovereign CDS pricing literature a negative
association between CDS spread and economic growth of sovereign entity is firmly
established. Therefore, a negative impact of social capital on CDS premium is hypothesized
in the third essay.
Empirical analysis conducted in the last essay finds strong support for the hypothesis
and reports that social capital negatively impacts CDS prices after controlling for country
specific macroeconomic variables. I found that a one percentage point increase in social
capital of a country, ceteris paribus, causes a reduction in CDS spread by 1.19% after
controlling for country specific macroeconomic variables. Moreover, I found that on average
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CDS spread is 16.22% lower for countries which have full democracies compared to one
which does not have true form of democracy in the year 2015. Finally, for developed
countries protection prices are less by 1.69% compared to that of developing sovereign
entities.
The second and third essays highlight the importance of socioeconomic variables which
should not be over looked by the stakeholders in determining the sovereign credit default
swap prices. Therefore, in addition to global and macroeconomic variables due consideration
should be given to related country specific socioeconomic variables while assessing the
country’s default risk and hence, pricing sovereign credit default swaps.

101

6 REFERENCES
Adler, M., & Song, J. (2010). The behavior of emerging market sovereigns' credit default swap
premiums and bond yield spreads. International Journal of Finance & Economics, 15(1), 3158.
Adler, P. S., & Kwon, S.-W. (2002). Social capital: Prospects for a new concept. Academy of
management review, 27(1), 17-40.
Aizenman, J., Hutchison, M., & Jinjarak, Y. (2013). What is the risk of European sovereign debt
defaults? Fiscal space, CDS spreads and market pricing of risk. Journal of International
Money and Finance, 34, 37-59.
Aizenman, J., Jinjarak, Y., & Park, D. (2016). Fundamentals and sovereign risk of emerging markets.
Pacific Economic Review, 21(2), 151-177.
Aktug, R. E., Nayar, N. N., & Vasconcellos, G. M. (2013). Is sovereign risk related to the banking
sector? Global Finance Journal, 24(3), 222-249.
Ammer, J., & Cai, F. (2011). Sovereign CDS and bond pricing dynamics in emerging markets: Does the
cheapest-to-deliver option matter? Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions
and Money, 21(3), 369-387.
Ang, A., & Longstaff, F. A. (2013). Systemic sovereign credit risk: Lessons from the US and Europe.
Journal of Monetary Economics, 60(5), 493-510.
Arce, O., Mayordomo, S., & Peña, J. I. (2011). Do sovereign CDS and bond markets share the same
information to price credit risk? An empirical application to the European monetary union
case. XIX Foro de Finanzas.

102
Arce, O., Mayordomo, S., & Peña, J. I. (2013). Credit-risk valuation in the sovereign CDS and bonds
markets: Evidence from the euro area crisis. Journal of International Money and Finance, 35,
124-145.
Augustin, P. (2014). Sovereign credit default swap premia. Forthcoming, Journal of Investment
Management.
Augustin, P., & Tédongap, R. (2014). Real economic shocks and sovereign credit risk. Journal of
Financial and Quantitative Analysis (JFQA), Forthcoming.
Avino, D., & Cotter, J. (2014). Sovereign and bank CDS spreads: two sides of the same coin? Journal
of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 32, 72-85.
Baba, N., & Inada, M. (2009). Price discovery of subordinated credit spreads for Japanese megabanks: Evidence from bond and credit default swap markets. Journal of International
Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 19(4), 616-632.
Baillie, R. T., Booth, G. G., Tse, Y., & Zabotina, T. (2002). Price discovery and common factor models.
Journal of Financial Markets, 5(3), 309-321.
Baldacci, E., Gupta, S., & Mati, A. (2011). Political and fiscal risk determinants of sovereign spreads in
emerging markets. Review of Development Economics, 15(2), 251-263.
Baliamoune-Lutz, M., & McGillivray, M. (2011). State fragility: Concept and measurement. Fragile
states: causes, costs, and responses, 33-42.
Blanco, R., Brennan, S., & Marsh, I. W. (2005). An empirical analysis of the dynamic relation between
investment‐grade bonds and credit default swaps. The Journal of Finance, 60(5), 2255-2281.
Caceres, C., Guzzo, V., & Segoviano Basurto, M. (2010). Sovereign spreads: Global risk aversion,
contagion or fundamentals? IMF working papers, 1-29.
Call, C. T. (2008). The fallacy of the ‘Failed State’. Third world quarterly, 29(8), 1491-1507.

103
Carboni, A. (2011). The sovereign credit default swap market: price discovery, volumes and links
with banks' risk premia. Bank of Italy Temi di Discussione (Working Paper) No, 821.
Carr, P., & Wu, L. (2007). Theory and evidence on the dynamic interactions between sovereign credit
default swaps and currency options. Journal of Banking & Finance, 31(8), 2383-2403.
Chan-Lau, M. J. A., & Kim, M. Y. S. (2004). Equity prices, credit default swaps, and bond spreads in
emerging markets: International Monetary Fund.
Cosset, J.-C., & Jeanneret, A. (2015). Sovereign credit risk and government effectiveness. Available
at SSRN 2215101.
Coudert, V., & Gex, M. (2013). The interactions between the credit default swap and the bond
markets in financial turmoil. Review of International Economics, 21(3), 492-505.
Criado, S., Degabriel, L., Lewandowska, M., Lindén, S., & Ritter, P. (2010). Report on sovereign CDS.
The Hedge Fund Journa, 55(5), 1407-1421.
Delis, M. D., & Mylonidis, N. (2011). The chicken or the egg? A note on the dynamic interrelation
between government bond spreads and credit default swaps. Finance Research Letters, 8(3),
163-170.
Dooley, M., & Hutchison, M. (2009). Transmission of the US subprime crisis to emerging markets:
Evidence on the decoupling–recoupling hypothesis. Journal of International Money and
Finance, 28(8), 1331-1349.
Duffie, D. (1999). Credit swap valuation. Financial Analysts Journal, 55(1), 73-87.
Fender, I., Hayo, B., & Neuenkirch, M. (2012). Daily pricing of emerging market sovereign CDS before
and during the global financial crisis. Journal of Banking & Finance, 36(10), 2786-2794.
Fontana, A., & Scheicher, M. (2010). An analysis of euro area sovereign CDS and their relation with
government bonds. Journal of Banking & Finance, 62(7), 126-140

104
Forte, S., & Pena, J. I. (2009). Credit spreads: An empirical analysis on the informational content of
stocks, bonds, and CDS. Journal of Banking & Finance, 33(11), 2013-2025.
Fukuyama, F. (1999). Social capital and civil society. IMF conference on second generation reforms.
Fukuyama, F. (2001). Social capital, civil society and development. Third world quarterly, 22(1), 7-20.
Fung, H.-G., Sierra, G. E., Yau, J., & Zhang, G. (2008). Are the US stock market and credit default swap
market related? Evidence from the CDX indices. Journal of Alternative Investments, 11(1),
43-61.
Georgievska, A., Georgievska, L., Stojanovic, A., & Todorovic, N. (2008). Sovereign rescheduling
probabilities in emerging markets: a comparison with credit rating agencies’ ratings. Journal
of Applied Statistics, 35(9), 1031-1051.
Gonzalo, J., & Granger, C. (1995). Estimation of common long-memory components in cointegrated
systems. Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 13(1), 27-35.
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2004). The role of social capital in financial development. The
American Economic Review, 94(3), 526-556.
Hansen, E., & Zegarra, J. (2016). Political risk and sovereign spreads in Latin America. Academia
Revista Latinoamericana de Administración, 29(2), 165-180.
Hasbrouck, J. (1995). One security, many markets: Determining the contributions to price discovery.
The Journal of Finance, 50(4), 1175-1199.
Hassan, M. K., Ngene, G. M., & Yu, J.-S. (2011a). Credit default swaps and sovereign debt markets.
Networks Financial Institute Working Paper.
Hassan, M. K., Ngene, G. M., & Yu, J.-S. (2011b). Credit default swaps and sovereign debt markets.
Economic Systems, 39(2), 240-252.
Hilscher, J., & Nosbusch, Y. (2010). Determinants of sovereign risk: Macroeconomic fundamentals
and the pricing of sovereign debt. Review of Finance, 14(2), 235-262.

105
Hull, J., Predescu, M., & White, A. (2004). The relationship between credit default swap spreads,
bond yields, and credit rating announcements. Journal of Banking & Finance, 28(11), 27892811.
Hull, J. C., & White, A. (2000). Valuing credit default swaps I: No counterparty default risk. The
Journal of Derivatives. 8(1), 29-40.
Jha, A., & Chen, Y. (2014). Audit fees and social capital. The Accounting Review, 90(2), 611-639.
Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997). Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-country
investigation. The Quarterly journal of economics, 1251-1288.
Lee, J., Naranjo, A., & Sirmans, S. (2013). The exodus from sovereign risk: Sovereign ceiling violations
in credit default swap markets. Available at SSRN 2237913.
Levy, A. (2009). The CDS bond basis spread in emerging markets: Liquidity and counterparty risk
effects (draft).
Li, N. (2009). The price discovery process in credit derivative market: evidence from sovereign CDS
market. American Journal of Finance and Accounting, 1(4), 393-407.
Li, N., & Huang, A. Y. (2011). Price discovery between sovereign credit default swaps and bond yield
spreads of emerging markets. Journal of Emerging Market Finance, 10(2), 197-225.
Longstaff, F. A., Mithal, S., & Neis, E. (2005). Corporate yield spreads: Default risk or liquidity? New
evidence from the credit default swap market. The Journal of Finance, 60(5), 2213-2253.
Longstaff, F. A., Pan, J., Pedersen, L. H., & Singleton, K. J. (2011). How sovereign is sovereign credit
risk? American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 3(2), 75-103.
Mellios, C., & Paget-Blanc, E. (2006). Which factors determine sovereign credit ratings? The
European Journal of Finance, 12(4), 361-377.
Norden, L., & Weber, M. (2009). The co‐movement of credit default swap, bond and stock markets:
An empirical analysis. European financial management, 15(3), 529-562.

106
Oyotode, R., & Raja, Z. A. (2015). Social Capital and Debt Enforcement: An International Analysis.
Available at SSRN 2662150.
Pan, J., & Singleton, K. J. (2008). Default and recovery implicit in the term structure of sovereign CDS
spreads. The Journal of Finance, 63(5), 2345-2384.
Procasky, W. J., & Ujah, N. U. (2016). Terrorism and its impact on the cost of debt. Journal of
International Money and Finance, 60, 253-266.
Putnam, R. D. (1993). The prosperous community. The american prospect, 4(13), 35-42.
Reinhart, C. M., & Rogoff, K. S. (2009). This time is different: eight centuries of financial folly:
Princeton University Press.
Remolona, E. M., Scatigna, M., & Wu, E. (2008). The dynamic pricing of sovereign risk in emerging
markets: Fundamentals and risk aversion. Journal of Fixed Income, Vol. Spring.
Sutton, M. B., & Catão, M. L. (2002). Sovereign defaults: the role of volatility: International Monetary
Fund.
Topbas, N. (2013). Sovereign Credit Risk and Credit Default Swap Spread Reflections. Paper
presented at the International Conference on Economic and Social Studies, 10-11 May,
2013, Sarajevo.
Varga, L. (2009). The information content of Hungarian sovereign CDS spreads. MNB occasional
papers 78.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data: MIT press.
Zeaiter, H. (2015). Sovereign debt defaults: Evidence from developing countries. Journal of economic
research, 20(2), 199-229.
Zhu, H. (2006). An empirical comparison of credit spreads between the bond market and the credit
default swap market. Journal of Financial Services Research, 29(3), 211-235.

107

7 VITA
ZUBAIR A. RAJA
Texas A&M International University
International Banking and Finance Division
(Cell): 956-334-3330
A.R. Sanchez, Jr. School of Business
Email: zubairraja@dusty.tamiu.edu
5201 University Boulevard, Laredo, TX 78041
_________________________________________________________________________________
EDUCATION
Ph.D. (Finance Concentration)
MBA (Intl. Business)
MBA (Finance)
BSc. Computer Science

Texas A&M International University, USA
Texas A&M International University, USA
The University of Punjab, PK
University of Engineering & Technology, PK

2017
2012
2009
2002

ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE
Texas A&M International University, USA (2012- August 2017)
Graduate Research Assistant and Instructor









Introduction to Finance (FIN 3310-261, Spring 2017)
Financing Business Ventures (FIN 3333-161, Fall 2015)
Intro to Financial Accounting (ACC 2301-301, Summer-I 2016 and 2017)
Intro to Managerial Accounting (ACC 2302-401, Summer-II 2016 and 2017)
Federal Taxation (ACC 3350-101, Fall 2016)
Issues in Accounting (ACC 4399-160, Fall 2016)
Intro to Business Statistics (DS 2310-261, Summer-II 2014, Summer-II 2015, Spring 2016)
Average Teaching Evaluation: 4.5/5.0

INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE
 Operations Manager Retail at Standard Chartered Bank, Pakistan (February 2010- July 2011)
 Customers Services Manager at BankIslami Pakistan Limited (July 2007- January 2010)
 Consumer Banking and Trade Finance Officer at Bank Alfalah Limited, Pakistan (February
2004- July 2007)
AWARDS & CERTIFICATIONS
 Best Student Paper Award, “Credit Default Swap’s Contribution to the Price Discovery Process
of Emerging Market’s Sovereign Credit Risk” at 21st Annual Western Hemispheric Trade
Conference held in Laredo, TX, 5-7th April 2017
 Best Student Paper Award, “Social Capital and Debt Enforcement: An International Analysis”
(with Oyotode, R.) at 20th Annual Western Hemispheric Trade Conference held in Laredo, TX,
13-15th April 2016
 Won many prizes in prestigious national level software competitions in Pakistan

